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The New Law of the Child
abstract. This Article sets forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and shaping
children’s relationship to law. The existing legal regime, which we term the “authorities framework,” focuses too narrowly on state and parental control over children, reducing children’s interests to those of dependency and the attainment of autonomy. In place of this limited focus, we
envision a “new law of the child” that promotes a broader range of children’s present and future
interests, including children’s interests in parental relationships and nonparental relationships
with children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity
and privacy; and participation in civic life. Once articulated, these broader interests lay the foundation for a radical reconceptualization of the ﬁeld of children and law. We propose a new tripartite
framework of relationships, responsibilities, and rights that aims to transform how law treats children and their interactions with others. The framework addresses children’s needs for state and
parental control in many instances while also moving beyond those concerns to foster children’s
interests in the here and now.
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the new law of the child

introduction
This Article sets forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and
shaping children’s relationship to law. The existing regime of laws relating to
children hinges on the fundamental question of adult control over children and
their development. We name and critique this prevailing approach the “authorities framework” and set forth the normative justiﬁcations and parameters for a
new paradigm. We envision a “new law of the child” that promotes a wide range
of children’s present and future interests in addition to assigning adult authority
over children’s dependency and development.
Our new paradigm is rooted in a broad understanding of children’s interests
as children in the here and now, encompassing but moving beyond a developmental focus on children’s dependency or their attainment of autonomy. Drawing from the social science literature, scholarship on children and law, and judicial decisions, we identify ﬁve broader interests that law should recognize and
promote: children’s interests in parental and nonparental relationships, including relationships with children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation in civic life.
This new law of the child situates children’s interests within a normative universe that values the extraordinary richness and variety of children’s lives. Although our approach would impose greater restrictions on adult authority in
some circumstances, it also calls on law to be more attuned to children’s diverse
interests within the family, school, and other arenas. We believe law should recognize, maintain, and promote a broader range of children’s relationships, including relationships with nonparental adults and with other children. Relatedly, law should advance children’s exposure to new ideas in ways that will spur
their curiosity, learning, and exploration of their own identities as they grow.
Law should also ensure that children have opportunities to express themselves
in school and elsewhere, while at the same time protecting children from intrusions on their bodily integrity and personal privacy. And, ﬁnally, law should seek
to further children’s participation in civic life as a central component of their engagement in the world.
In bringing to light this broader range of children’s interests in the here and
now, our approach highlights that children’s lives are more than lesser versions
of adult lives or way stations on the road to autonomous adulthood. Our focus
on children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy takes account of the
unique strengths and capacities of children, as well as the special vulnerabilities
that distinguish human experience in this early stage of life. By focusing on children’s lives in the here and now, we aim to free the ﬁeld of children and law from
the ideal of the autonomous, freely acting adult individual. Our approach takes
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seriously the idea of children as individuals in their own right, worthy of respect,
even as they are dependent in varying ways upon the adults in their lives.
By shifting the focus from adult authority to children’s broader interests, our
framework opens up the possibility for a new conceptual ordering of the laws
governing children. The ﬁeld of children and law is currently organized by location: primarily home, school, and the juvenile justice system. The ﬁve interests
we identify lead us to radically restructure the ﬁeld around a tripartite framework
of relationships, responsibilities, and rights. We begin with relationships because children’s custodial status deﬁnes their ﬁrst and primary relationship to
law. Yet our approach goes beyond acknowledging relationships of authority to
encompass children’s nonhierarchical relationships with siblings, other children,
and nonparental adults. These relationships in turn inform the second prong of
the tripartite framework: adult responsibilities for children. While custodial
caregivers have important responsibilities, we identify a broader set of actors
who should carry legally recognized and shared responsibilities toward children,
including state actors and adults outside the family. These adult responsibilities
encompass duties related to caregiving and protection, education, rehabilitation,
and fostering of civic engagement. The third and ﬁnal prong of the tripartite
framework addresses the full range of rights that should be enjoyed by parents
and children—not simply rights of authority—most importantly children’s afﬁrmative rights to certain relationships, goods, and services.
By restructuring the ﬁeld around relationships, responsibilities, and rights,
we hope to identify and promote children’s broader interests in an integrated and
consistent way. To this end, our approach reimagines the traditional “best interests of the child” standard, which until now has largely operated as a cover for
the exercise of unprincipled judicial discretion based on poorly thought-out factors focused on children’s dependency. Our approach instead redeﬁnes the best
interests standard in light of ﬁve broad interests—generous in scope and rich in
content—that serve as fundamental, practical guides for judicial, administrative,
and legislative decision-making across all domains of children’s lives. Under a
best interests standard explicitly oriented around children’s broader interests,
decisionmakers will be equipped to weigh children’s interests in a transparent,
coherent, and consistent way in the domains of family, school, juvenile justice,
immigration, and other arenas, always with an eye toward maximizing their present and future well-being.
Relatedly, the new law of the child loosens the grip of parental rights on
American law. Under our approach, the law’s existing deference to parental
rights in both statutes and legal decisions would give way to a more child-centered analysis that elevates children’s broader interests over parents’ individual
liberty claims. Parental rights have a role to play under the new law of the child,
but only to the extent they further children’s broader interests, which include
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children’s interest in developing and maintaining relationships with their parents free from state control. Parental rights should never automatically trump
the interests of all others—most importantly, those of children themselves. For
example, our approach would eliminate parental freedom to inﬂict corporal punishment on children on the ground that this type of punishment violates a child’s
interests in bodily integrity and rehabilitation. Our framework would also limit
parents’ rights to homeschool their children in most circumstances, requiring
more intensive state oversight of homeschooling for children in the early years
and prohibiting it altogether for most children past the primary grades, based
primarily on children’s interest in exposure to ideas. We reject the classic defense
of parental rights—that they are necessary to limit state intervention in the family—by emphasizing the state’s existing presence in the lives of all children and
the role parental rights may play in suppressing children’s diverse values and experiences. Instead of ignoring conﬂicts within the family and between the family
and the state over children’s present and future well-being, we accept such conﬂicts as necessary for understanding and furthering the broad range of children’s
interests as children.
Moreover, our approach supports the recognition and enforcement of children’s affirmative rights rooted in their broader interests in the here and now.
The new law of the child rejects the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, which held that children have no
affirmative right to safety within the home, thereby ignoring the shared responsibilities of both parents and the state to further children’s interest in protection
from harm at the hands of custodial caregivers.1 In a direct departure from existing constitutional law, the new law of the child would recognize children’s afﬁrmative rights as children to certain goods and services essential to furthering
their broader interests. In some cases, affirmative rights would entitle children
to initiate court actions to enforce these rights, although these rights would primarily be enforced in custody, visitation, school, immigration, and other proceedings.
Our approach also reconceives children’s interests in exercising control over
their own lives as “agency” rights rather than “autonomy” rights. We do so in
order to emphasize that children often have the capacity to make decisions for
themselves at the same time that they are dependent upon adults. For example,
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of children to wear black armbands at school in protest of the
Vietnam War.2 Although we support the Court’s holding that children possess
free speech rights while in school, we do so not because children possess adult-

1.
2.

489 U.S. 189 (1989).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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like autonomy rights, as the Court concluded, but rather because children have
their own interests in exposure to the world of ideas and to expression of their
developing views and identities. These rights are necessarily tailored to ﬁt children’s broader interests, including their interests in safety and learning in school.
Our conception of children’s agency rights reﬂects a richer, more nuanced conception of children’s capacity to direct their own lives even while dependent upon
a wide range of adults.
Finally, the new law of the child attempts to put an end to seemingly futile
debates over children’s “maturity.” The concept of maturity has emerged in recent years as a focal point of legal decision making about children. Children who
are deemed mature have access to adult rights and responsibilities, while those
who are deemed immature remain subject to more paternalistic regulations. Yet
focusing exclusively on maturity risks masking the real interests at stake in any
given situation. For example, scholars and legal decision-makers struggle to reconcile two well-accepted cases: Roper v. Simmons, holding that adolescents are
not as responsible as adults and, hence, should not be subject to the death penalty,3 and Bellotti v. Baird, holding that adolescents are often responsible enough
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.4 By focusing on children’s broader
interests—rather than on “maturity” or “responsibility”—our approach illuminates what is really at stake in these cases: in Roper, children’s interests in criminal rehabilitation and bodily integrity, and in Bellotti, children’s interests in sexuality, reproductive agency, expression of identity, and civic engagement. While
maturity is not irrelevant to identifying and weighing these interests, it should
not be the endpoint of the analysis.
The new law of the child thus lays the foundation for revising or overruling
many foundational Supreme Court decisions in addition to those already discussed. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court upheld a Massachusetts
child labor statute that prevented an eight-year-old girl from distributing religious literature on the street at night accompanied by her guardian, on the
ground that the state’s parens patriae power justiﬁed the protection of the child
from harm.5 By contrast, our approach would consider the child’s broad interests
in her relationship with her guardian, in expressing her religious identity, and in
engaging in the world beyond home and school. Similarly, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which granted Amish parents the right to withdraw their children from secondary school,6 failed to take account of children’s
3.
4.
5.
6.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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interest in exposure to new ideas through educational opportunities outside the
home. As already noted, our framework likely justiﬁes limits on homeschooling
for older children and increased regulation of homeschooling for younger children. The new law of the child would also take an entirely different approach to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.7 Instead of relying on the
primacy of parental rights to reject grandparents’ claims to maintain relationships with their grandchildren, our framework would make children’s interests
in maintaining relationships with nonparental ﬁgures the centerpiece of the
analysis.
Our reformulation of the ﬁeld of children and law permits a clearer examination of the ways law currently shapes children’s lives through its treatment of
the parent-child relationship and through its construction of children’s dependency. Because the existing authorities framework is presumed to reﬂect children’s
lives as they are, its true expressive effects have remained unexamined. Looking
closely, however, we see that the state intervenes in the parent-child relationship
not simply at the back-end when disputes arise, but also at the front-end when
conferring parental rights and family privacy. Legal scholars have generally failed
to explore these expressive effects.8 This silence risks naturalizing a particular
model of childhood, unnecessarily limiting the scope of reform by placing certain
aspects of children’s lives beyond the reach of law.
Law has the power to reﬂect and shape multiple aspects of children’s lives.
The new law of the child seeks to recognize and promote facets of children’s lives
beyond dependency and autonomy, thereby expanding and altering the law’s
current focus. This new paradigm offers a more nuanced and comprehensive
formulation of the ways in which law does, and does not, govern children’s lives.
At the same time, our approach does more than reﬂect existing reality; it also
signals that certain, presently unrecognized aspects of children’s lives should be
valued by society. Our approach therefore aims to transform existing understandings of children and their interactions with each other and with adults. In
this way, the new law of the child both uncovers aspects of children’s lives obscured by existing law and draws upon these broader aspects to encourage new
ways of living for both children and adults.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the history and current conﬁguration of the prevailing approach to children and law—which we term the
“authorities framework.” After describing the authorities framework, this Part
7.
8.

530 U.S. 57 (2000).
For general discussions of the interplay between legal narratives and cultural narratives, see
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); and Marc
Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 121 (Keith O.
Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 2015).
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goes on to enumerate its four major shortcomings: it fails to acknowledge and
promote the well-being of children in the here and now; it unduly prioritizes
parental rights over children’s interests; it perpetuates a myth of nonintervention
in the family; and it relies on limited conceptions of both dependency and autonomy. In Part II, we begin the task of identifying and elaborating children’s
interests beyond autonomy and dependency that better take account of children’s
lives in the here and now. These interests include children’s interests in relationships with parents as well as with children and other adults; exposure to new
ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation
in civic life. These ﬁve broader interests in turn lead us in Part III to reconceptualize the ﬁeld of children and law around a new tripartite framework of relationships, responsibilities, and rights, opening the door for legal decision makers to
further children’s broader interests in a transparent, coherent, and consistent
way across a myriad of legal domains. In so doing, this new law of the child seeks
to better capture and promote the diversity and richness of children’s lives in the
here and now.
i. the authorities framework and its failings
The ﬁeld of children and law currently rests on the foundational question of
who has authority over children’s lives—parents, the state, or (less frequently)
children themselves.9 In addressing this question, courts and legislatures focus
on identifying when children are dependent on adults and when they are capable
of making independent decisions about their own lives. Analysis may be best
conceptualized as an inverted triangle, with parents and the state occupying the
top points and children the bottom. 10 Lines of authority connect the three
points, as courts and legislatures specify when parental authority over children
trumps state interests, when state interests trump parental authority, and the
rare instances when children’s desires trump both.11

9.

Throughout this Article, we use the term “child” to mean a person younger than the governing
age of majority and not fully emancipated under law. In all states, the presumptive age of
majority is eighteen, although for some purposes the age is either higher (alcohol consumption) or lower (consensual sexual relations). See Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 526-27 (2014).
10. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833-34 (2007); see
also Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 29 (“The competition for developmental control of a child is classically
framed as a competition between parent and state.”).
11. Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34.
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This emphasis on children’s dependency and eventual capacity underlies the
entire ﬁeld of children and law, in large part because adult authority over children derives its primary legal justiﬁcation from children’s dependent status. As
the Supreme Court has explained, “The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”12 This legal
conception of childhood is so widely accepted by U.S. courts, policymakers, and
scholars that it has no name; it is simply the way things are.13
We coin the term “authorities framework” to describe this current state of
the ﬁeld. Doing so allows us both to better analyze the existing law governing
children and to emphasize that the current organization of the ﬁeld is neither
natural nor inevitable. Rather, this organization is rooted in a control-based conception of parental rights that perpetuates the myth that the state does not intervene in most families. Once we reveal this existing framework, we analyze
how it leads to an unjustiﬁably narrow focus on dependency and autonomy to
the exclusion of children’s other interests.
A. The Authorities Framework
The authorities framework is rooted in the early common-law propertybased theory of exclusive parental ownership of children. This theory located
absolute control over children in parents—primarily fathers—based on actual or
presumed biological ties.14 As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse describes, well into

12.

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
For representative samples of work in the ﬁeld of children and law, see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM,
WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2005); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS:
THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2001); BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN
SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008);
Appleton, supra note 9; Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879
(1984); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002); Anne C. Dailey, Children’s
Constitutional Rights, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2099 (2011); Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to
Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43
HARV. EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); Rosenbury, supra note 10; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children's Rights and the
Problem of Equal Respect, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799 (1999); and Michael S. Wald, Children’s
Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1979).
14. This common-law regime addressed itself primarily to white children; slave children, for example, were governed by a different set of laws. The legacy of this two-tier system is found
in the child welfare system, which disproportionately involves African American families. See
ROBERTS, supra note 13; Dorothy Roberts, Child Protection as Surveillance of African American
Families, 36 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 426 (2014). Relatedly, after a period of widespread
13.
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the nineteenth century, a father could force his children to work and collect the
wages for himself; he could marry off his female children to persons of his choosing; and he determined where and with whom his children would reside,
whether with himself, the mother, or some third party.15 In addition, fathers had
the right to physically control and punish their children, in some states up to the
point of death. 16 This absolute control was often framed as an arrangement
whereby fathers were obligated to provide for children in exchange for “labour
and services,” although children were required to submit to that exchange. 17
Somewhat paradoxically, law prior to the late nineteenth century viewed children as autonomous beings, still under the control of their parents but not signiﬁcantly different from adults.18 Accordingly, this early regime did not condition parental control on children’s dependency or incapacity.
This regime changed by the late nineteenth century, as the state assumed
greater decision-making power and control over children. Parental control was
no longer an absolute God-given right, but instead became a more limited, stateconferred entitlement grounded in public concerns and children’s “best interests.”19 Although the state had long possessed a common-law duty toward “infants, idiots, and lunatics,” the ascendant doctrine of parens patriae came to justify

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

removal of children from reservations, custodial placements concerning American Indian children are now governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(2012).
See WOODHOUSE, supra note 13; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998) [hereinafter Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood]; see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1985) (noting that
colonial American communities charged the father with the “duty of maintaining a well-governed home and sustained his authority by granting him control of its inhabitants as well as
of family property and other resources”); STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 1-17 (1988) (describing the patriarchal structure of Puritan families); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1139-40 (arguing that “the authority of colonial fathers over children clearly
reﬂected the authoritarian views of sovereignty held by the likes of Hobbes and the Puritan
Robert Bolton”).
See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1044-46 (1992).
Id. at 1038 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 163 (1827)).
See John Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 43 AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1974, at 422,
428.
See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1037-40.
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the state’s power to override parental authority in the name of children’s welfare,20 sometimes with the goal of expanding state control over families of color,
immigrant families, and other marginalized groups. 21 At the same time, late
nineteenth-century thinkers introduced the idea of children as innocent, dependent beings different from adults and in need of special protection and care,
thus strengthening the justiﬁcation for state intervention in children’s lives. 22
The emerging view of children as dependent, along with increasing state involvement, ultimately dislodged traditional notions of children as property,
bringing about the development of more humane labor, juvenile justice, and
child welfare laws, as well as compulsory education laws.23
Although the doctrine of absolute parental power has now been abandoned,24 the law nevertheless retains a strong commitment to parental rights. In
case after case, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional rights of parents “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”25
Indeed, as the Court has observed, “the interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.”26 Of course, when parents fail to fulﬁll their
20.

21.

22.
23.

24.

25.

26.

See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47; see also Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English
Child Custody Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1344 (1999) (tracing the term parens patriae through early English custody
law).
Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1017-21 (describing the history of Oregon’s compulsory public education law as an exercise of parens patriae authority reﬂecting both anti-Catholic assimilationist goals as well as more egalitarian, progressive ideas for reform).
See ROSALIND EKMAN LADD, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS RE-VISIONED: PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 2
(1996).
See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (recounting the long arc of the history of children’s status in the United States).
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“[T]he state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . . .”).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stressing the importance of parents’ interest in the care and
control of their children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (referring to the right
to raise one’s children as “essential”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same).
This authority ﬂows in part from constitutional and common-law notions of family privacy.
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing, in a case litigated under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, that the family is “a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children”); see also Buss, supra note 10, at 29 (discussing the traditional
“exclusion of other private parties competing with parents for some or all control over a child’s
upbringing”).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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caregiving duties, they may forfeit their rights: the state may subject parents to
criminal prosecution for neglect or abandonment, or it may subject them to civil
child welfare proceedings that can lead to the termination of parental rights altogether.27 But if parents minimally fulﬁll their duties, the state protects their
relationships with their children and their childrearing choices.28 Contemporary
judges, policymakers, and scholars therefore generally embrace parental rights
as the appropriate starting point for protecting children’s interests.29 Children
are no longer considered property, but they remain under the direction and control of parents in the ﬁrst instance.
The authorities framework has evolved somewhat in recent decades as modern courts and legislatures have begun to recognize children’s rights and autonomy interests in some contexts. Of course, children have long enjoyed certain
constitutional liberties, such as the right not to be enslaved under the Thirteenth
Amendment and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life or liberty under
the Due Process Clause.30 Nevertheless, well into the twentieth century, children
27.

See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires that the state support its allegations of unﬁtness with clear and convincing evidence).
28. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (ﬁnding that “all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their ﬁtness before their children are removed from their
custody”).
29. A few legal scholars, most notably Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, have critiqued the continuing
coercion inherent in this conception of parental rights, in which power ﬂows in only one, topdown direction. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REV.
2493, 2520 (1995); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s Rights”:
The Child’s Voice in Deﬁning the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321 (1994); Woodhouse, supra note
16, at 999-1002 (arguing that Meyer and Pierce view children as parents’ private property).
Nevertheless, most scholars justify law’s commitment to parental rights on the ground that
parental rights are in fact the best way to further children’s interests. See, e.g., Katharine K.
Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1523, 1543-45 (1998) (emphasizing that parental decision-making is necessary because
children are “emotionally dependent,” and they need the parental relationship in order to acquire “the ability to learn and reason and develop”); Buss, supra note 13, at 656 (“[T]he beneﬁts to children, ﬁrst acknowledged when parental rights were conceived in proprietary terms,
now stand as an independent justiﬁcation for continuing to afford parents a tremendous degree of control.”); see also Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 284-90; John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495, 506-10 (1985); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 940-41 (1996); Ferdinand Schoeman,
Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071,
1077-79 (2003); Scott & Scott, supra note 13, at 2415.
30. See Dailey, supra note 13, at 2100.
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enjoyed—at best—only a minimal set of entitlements associated with basic liberties. Beginning in the 1960s, courts and legislatures independently acknowledged children’s developing capacities and, in some contexts, concluded that
older children have sufficient cognitive and emotional skills to entitle them to
certain negative rights similar to those enjoyed by adults.31 In 1967, the Supreme
Court expressly conﬁrmed that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone,” ﬁnding that older children have constitutional
rights for purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings.32 Since In re Gault, the
Court has issued a series of decisions recognizing autonomy rights for children,
including Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which held
that older children have adult constitutional rights for purposes of school
speech.33
This recognition of children’s autonomy comes into play most often with respect to adolescent decision making outside of the home, particularly at school
and in the labor market.34 Occasionally, however, judges may take older children’s views into account even when addressing family disputes, such as in the
areas of custody35 and healthcare decision-making.36 Criminal law often treats
children as autonomous legal actors, with states enacting laws that permit, and
31.
32.

33.
34.

35.

36.

See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 13, at 1-16 (providing a “brief history” of arguments in favor
of children’s rights beginning in the 1960s).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794
(2011) (“No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, but that
does not include a free-ﬂoating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”
(internal citations omitted)); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(ﬁnding that a law requiring parental consent to obtain an abortion violated minors’ due process rights).
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1294.3 (West 2011) (permitting employment of minors for certain
occupations); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (declaring that students have free speech rights in
school).
In New York custody disputes, for instance, courts must weigh the child’s wishes, but must
also “consider the age and maturity of the child and the potential for inﬂuence having been
exerted on the child.” Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263-64 (N.Y. 1982). When a
judge believes that the child’s feelings may be “transient,” the judge may give no weight to the
child’s wishes. Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1969).
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“[E]very minor must have the opportunity—if she so desires—to
go directly to a court without ﬁrst consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisﬁes the court
that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on
her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.”);
Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967) (“A married minor, 18 years of age, who has
successfully completed high school and is the head of his own family, who earns his own living
and maintains his own home, is emancipated for the purpose of giving a valid consent to
surgery . . . .”).
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in some circumstances require, juvenile offenders to be tried in adult criminal
court.37 Respecting children’s autonomy interests sometimes calls for an individualized examination of a child’s maturity, as in emancipation hearings and judicial bypass hearings in the abortion context.38 At other times, respecting children’s autonomy interests entails a categorical drop in the age at which children
may be treated like adults, as may be the case with driving,39 sexual activity,40
and the prosecution of some crimes.41
The modern trend toward recognizing children’s autonomy in certain contexts has nevertheless failed to alter law’s view of children as fundamentally dependent beings in need of adult supervision and control.42 One need not master
the ﬁeld of children and law to recognize that our legal system denies children
basic personal, social, and political rights. Most children do not have state or

37.

38.
39.

40.

41.

42.

Forty-ﬁve states allow juvenile cases to be transferred to adult court at the judge’s discretion;
in ﬁfteen of those states, transfer is mandatory for some offenses. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying
Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUV.
JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION 3 (Sept. 2011), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434
.pdf [http://perma.cc/GUY3-JE7S]; see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and
Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 33-39 (2013) (providing background on juvenile transfer laws). In other states, prosecutors have the discretion to ﬁle
charges for certain crimes in adult or juvenile court. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1)(a),
(b) (West 2008).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150 (West 2009) (emancipation); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
643-44 (judicial bypass).
The age at which minors may drive is as low as fourteen in South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 32-12-11 (2011), and as high as seventeen in New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-13.4 (West
2012).
For discussions of variable ages of sexual consent, see Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5 (2013);
Anna High, Good, Bad and Wrongful Juvenile Sex: Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape Laws
Against the Protected Class, 69 ARK. L. REV. 787 (2016); and Michelle Oberman, Regulating
Consensual Sex with Minors: Deﬁning a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703 (2000).
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History
and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO
THE CRIMINAL COURT 83, 127-28 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
Indeed, by the mid-1990s, most scholars in the United States had abandoned their children’s
rights projects. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 13, at 42 (“The immutable truth of childrearing
is that someone has to be in charge.”); Minow, supra note 13.
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federal rights to vote,43 marry,44 work for wages,45 make healthcare decisions,46
have sex,47 travel,48 refuse an education,49 be on the streets at night,50 purchase
pornography, 51 attend (or not attend) religious services against parental
wishes,52 or enjoy most other freedoms enjoyed by adults. Justice Powell stated
that these differences “abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law
and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote
and to hold office.”53 Far from being left alone to make their own choices, children are directed by their parents and the state into relationships, activities, educational instruction, and ways of life not of their own choosing.54
Children’s rights therefore remain relatively limited and qualiﬁed despite
language in Supreme Court decisions suggesting that children broadly enjoy

43.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.

44.

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3(A) (West 2016). However, a child may marry with parental permission. See, e.g., id. § 3(B).
See 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (2017) (setting a “general 16-year minimum age which applies to all
employment” other than agriculture and with other limited exceptions).
Traditionally, children under eighteen cannot consent to medical treatment; doctrines like the
mature minor doctrine make an exception for children of sufficient maturity. See Shawna
Benston, Not of Minor Consequence?: Medical Decision-Making Autonomy and the Mature Minor
Doctrine, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2016).
In Georgia, for instance, two ﬁfteen-year-olds who engage in sex are guilty of a misdemeanor.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (2016). In Michigan, two ﬁfteen-year-olds who engage in sex are
guilty of a felony. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d (West 2004).
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that, at common law,
parents or guardians control the physical freedom of unemancipated minors).
All states require parents to send their children to public school or otherwise provide them an
education. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1
(2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (2015); 24 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010 (West
2011).
See Schleifer ex rel. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998); State v.
J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2004). But see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 187 (2d Cir.
2003) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a town curfew and striking it down based on the
town’s failure to tie the policy to the “special traits, vulnerabilities, and needs of minors”).
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
In Vermont, for instance, parents have the statutory right to control a child’s religion. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 664(1)(A) (2010). This right is so critical that the Vermont Supreme
Court has stricken portions of a family court order prohibiting both parents from requiring
children “to attend religious services against their will.” Jakab v. Jakab, 664 A.2d 261, 266 (Vt.
1995).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Buss, supra note 10, at 29-31; Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 857-58.

45.
46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

51.
52.

53.
54.
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constitutional rights.55 For example, children have free speech rights in school
only so long as that speech does not disrupt the learning environment.56 Adolescent girls have substantive due process rights to choose to terminate a pregnancy,
but states may condition girls’ access to abortion on parental consent or judicial
determinations of maturity or best interests.57 Rather than bestowing broad autonomy rights on children, the Court regularly reiterates the view of children as
dependent beings with lesser rights than adults. As the Court has explained,
“[c]hildren, by deﬁnition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves.”58 Rather, it remains the case that, under the law, “[t]hey are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae.”59
Moreover, courts, policymakers, and scholars increasingly draw on empirical
studies to argue that children are less mature than the law has generally presumed.60 In a series of juvenile sentencing decisions involving older adolescents,

55.

See Dailey, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (granting broader
free speech rights to adults).
57. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (upholding parental consent requirements as long as the state also “provide[s] an alternative procedure [such as a
judicial determination of maturity or best interests] whereby authorization for the abortion
can be obtained”).
56.

58.

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).

59.

Id. A decade and a half earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting the sale of
pornography to minors. The Court, paraphrasing a member of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, noted that “a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an
intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
642 n.10 (1968). In Justice Stewart’s words, the child “is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 649-50
(Stewart, J., concurring).
60. For examples of recent case law, see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 & 472 n.5 (2012),
which held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for individuals under eighteen
years old at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 nn.5-6 (2011), which held
that a child’s age should inform the Miranda analysis; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 7475 (2010), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without
parole sentences on juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide and that the state must
give convicted juvenile nonhomicide offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
from incarceration; and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-74 (2005), which held that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of individuals who were under
eighteen years old at the time of their capital crime. For an example of scholarship, see Richard
J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22

1464

the new law of the child

the Supreme Court recognized children’s “inherent difference from adults in
their capacity as agents, as choosers, as shapers of their own lives.”61 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court ruled that a state law permitting the execution of defendants
who committed their crimes as juveniles was unconstitutional. 62 Even seventeen-year-olds, the Roper Court explained, are often more immature, irresponsible, impetuous, and reckless than adults and therefore less culpable for their
crimes and less deserving of severe punishment. 63 This assessment relied, in
part, on empirical studies indicating that adolescent brains are not fully formed
and that the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for strategizing, setting priorities, and controlling impulses, is particularly underdeveloped in adolescence.64 Subsequent decisions in the criminal justice context continue to describe
minors as inherently less capable—and thus less culpable—than adults.65
The authorities framework’s recognition of adolescents’ autonomy thus remains muddled, leading to contradictory conclusions about children’s capacity
but not much else. Federal and state laws now specify differing bright-line ages
for when children become legal adults for purposes of marriage, sexual activity,
employment, driving, drinking, voting, and criminal prosecution. 66 Similarly,
courts have determined that children enjoy adult-like rights of speech, privacy,
and association for some purposes, but must wait until adulthood before they
may exercise these rights fully.67 The diverse and shifting nature of these age cutoffs speaks volumes about the difficulty—and, in some cases, the futility—of attempting to justify laws by reference to children’s decision-making abilities. In-

61.

62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 158-61 (2013), which discusses how an understanding of teenagers’ higher likelihood of risk taking should inform law but notes that current
knowledge is not yet adequate for legal purposes.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988); see also Emily Buss, Developmental
Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 742-46 (2016) (discussing the Court’s acceptance of developmental science).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
Id. at 569-71.
Id.; see also Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile
Punishment, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 339, 349 (2013) (“More complex ‘executive’ functions of
[the] prefrontal cortex such as reasoning, motivation, and judgment appear to develop gradually during childhood and adolescence, perhaps continuing during the adult years.” (quoting
Peter R. Huttenlocher & Arun S. Dabholkar, Regional Differences in Synaptogenesis in Human
Cerebral Cortex, 387 J. COMP. NEUROLOGY 167, 178 (1997))).
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-73; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
See Appleton, supra note 9, at 526-27. For an example of a bright-line statute, see OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 3(A) (West 2016).
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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deed, the authorities framework provides no tools other than vague tests of “maturity” for deciding when children will be subject to adult control and when they
will be allowed to make their own decisions.
In fact, the variable age of adulthood often reﬂects social and political considerations other than, or in addition to, assumptions about children’s capacity
for autonomous decision making.68 This was evident when the voting age was
reduced to the draft age during the Vietnam War era,69 and it is evident now
when some states prosecute children as adults while other states do not.70 In addition, in the context of delinquency and abortion, in particular, judicial and
prosecutorial understandings of capacity and maturity may differ depending on
the race, class, or gender of the children in question in ways that may reﬂect bias
more than differing rates of development. One recent study found that adults
view girls of color as less innocent and more adult-like than white girls, especially
when they are between the ages of ﬁve and fourteen.71 Children of color are also
transferred from juvenile to adult criminal court at higher rates than white children.72 And, in addition to biases based on the identity of the children before
them, it appears that judges sometimes invoke maturity to justify decisions
rooted in impermissible value judgments. That is, children who make choices

68.

69.

70.
71.

72.

See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 494 (2002) (“The age of
majority is arbitrary not in the sense that it is unreasonable but in that it is variable from time
to time and is often established to reﬂect some, but not all, levels of maturity and capacity.”);
Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589,
639-45 (2002) (comparing Bellotti and Parham and concluding that the “cases, and the broader
category of children’s constitutional rights, become coherent when considered in terms of
public health and sound social policy”); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (1986) (“[I]t is more honest to
disclose that competence and incompetence are used here as proxies for a variety of concerns
about what societal decision-makers think children may need, and about what they simultaneously think allows adults to choose for themselves.”).
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 n.152 (1991)
(stating that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s extension of “the franchise to eighteen-yearolds grew out of the perceived unfairness of any gap between the Vietnam draft age and the
voting age”).
See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2017).
See Rebecca Epstein et al., Girlhood Interrupted: The Erasure of Black Girls’ Childhood, CTR. ON
POVERTY & INEQ. 7-8 (2017), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes
/poverty-inequality/upload/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DGY-LBXG].
Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81,
102 (2000); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 393-94 (2017).
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with which judges disagree—choices to have sex, to drink, or to obtain an abortion—may be more likely to be found “immature.”73
The authorities framework therefore continues to focus largely on children’s
dependency, with only a small and contradictory patchwork of laws extending
negative liberties to older children. The framework legitimates and fortiﬁes the
governing legal principles of parental rights and state parens patriae power.
American courts, policymakers, and scholars accept this schema when determining how law governs or should govern children’s lives. Although often assumed
to reﬂect the preexisting reality of children’s lives, the authorities framework is
in fact a choice that shapes the lives of children and their parents. And, as set
forth below, it does so in problematic ways.
B. Why the Authorities Framework Fails
Although many scholars have critiqued the public/private distinction that
colors disputes between parents and the state,74 none have questioned whether
authority is the proper lens through which to conceptualize the ﬁeld of children
and law in the ﬁrst place. The narrow focus on children’s dependency under a
regime of parental and state authority has multiple shortcomings. We focus on
the four we believe to be most problematic: the failure to acknowledge and promote the richness of children’s lives in the here and now; an undue prioritization
of parental rights over children’s interests; the ongoing perpetuation of the myth
of nonintervention in the family; and a persistent reliance by legal actors on limited conceptions of both dependency and autonomy.
1. Failure To Promote Children’s Interests in the Here and Now
The authorities framework focuses on the developmental arc from dependency to autonomy to the exclusion of other meaningful aspects of children’s lives.
Under this narrow view, children as a class are always dependent on either parents or the state, with courts and legislatures determining when some older adolescents should be treated as rights-bearing autonomous adults. By focusing

73.

For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in determining whether a seventeen-year-old
girl was sufficiently mature to refuse potentially life-saving cancer treatment, appears to have
emphasized the girl’s lack of autonomous decision-making skills as a proxy for social disapproval of her desire to refuse treatment. In re Cassandra C., 112 A.3d 158, 171-72 (Conn. 2015).
74. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 933 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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solely on this trajectory from dependency to autonomy,75 the authorities framework overlooks the fact that children enjoy active lives in the here and now, experiencing a wide range of emotions and pursuing a variety of aims apart from
their long-term investment in becoming adults.
Although children are dependent on adults in many contexts and developmental research is vital to any consideration of children and law, dependency and
autonomy are not the only deﬁning facets of children’s lives—nor should they
be. There is nothing innate or essential about children’s lives. Indeed, childhood
itself is a social construction.76 It may be deﬁned in relation to development,
other aspects of children’s experiences, or a combination thereof. 77 Moreover,
children’s experiences vary from child to child, are deeply situational, and change
over time. The authorities framework fails to recognize this rich diversity because it ties children’s needs and interests to a baseline of adulthood, regarding

75.

Even scholars who seek to challenge the developmental focus of the authorities framework
ultimately argue that children should have more autonomy within hierarchical relationships
with parents, teachers, and state actors. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715 (2013) (arguing that law should recognize children’s
interests in self-government within such relationships, including within the privacy of the
family).
76. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 547
(2000) (“American lawmakers have had relatively clear images of childhood and adulthood—
images that ﬁt with our conventional notions. Children are innocent beings, who are dependent, vulnerable and incapable of making competent decisions.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 113 (“Modern scholars recognize that childhood is a culturally constructed idea, rather than a universal fact.”). For literature outside of law, see PHILIPPE ARIÈS,
CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 15-33 (Robert Baldick trans.,
1962); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF
CHILDREN 3-12 (1985); Allison James, Understanding Childhood from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD 25, 28-29 (Peter B. Pufall & Richard P. Unsworth eds.,
2004); Alan Prout & Allison James, A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance,
Promise and Problems, in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHILDHOOD 7, 8 (Allison James & Alan Prout
eds., 1997); and Martin Woodhead, Psychology and the Cultural Construction of Children’s Needs,
in CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING CHILDHOOD, supra, at 63, 63-68.
77. In fact, the meaning of “childhood” shifts over time as it is constructed both structurally and
through daily practice. For discussions of the shifting meanings of childhood over time in the
United States, see CHILDHOOD IN AMERICA (Paula S. Fass & Mary Ann Mason eds., 2000);
and HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 347-67 (2005).
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children as pre-adults, always in the act of becoming full persons but not necessarily full persons in their own right.78 The authorities framework therefore perpetuates a particular construction of childhood in which children may only escape their dependency on adults by successfully developing into adults
themselves.
The ubiquitous “best interests of the child” standard, in its current conﬁguration, 79 deepens rather than resolves these concerns about the authorities
framework’s narrow view of children’s interests. Although the term “best interests” could encompass children’s interests broadly, the standard in practice has
been coopted by the authorities framework’s developmental bent and has been
frequently leveraged to protect parents’ ability to exercise proper authority over
children. Further, the best interests standard often masks signiﬁcant judicial discretion.80 Legislatures and courts deﬁne a child’s best interests by the simple attributes of age, gender, and other demographic factors or, in contrast, by reference to parents’ emotional health or wishes. 81 The preference of the child is
sometimes included as a factor in the determination, but this narrow focus on
preference often elevates children’s stated desires over their other interests,

78.

This construction is pervasive in family law doctrine, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68
(2000) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979), and scholarship, see,
e.g., Buss, supra note 10, at 32; Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 48288 (2006); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conﬂict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 967, 1002-11 (2003); Scott, supra note 76, at 550-51, 589-98. This focus is present even
in the work of scholars who are sympathetic to notions of children’s rights. See, e.g., John
Eekelaar, The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE
LAW 221, 229-34 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1992); Woodhouse, supra note 76, at 97-119.
79. This standard appears in almost every area of law relating to children, but it surfaces most
often in the areas of child custody and child welfare. For a thoughtful development of the
“best interests of the child” standard in child protective proceedings, see Jean Koh Peters, The
Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996).
80. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1984).
81. For example, some custody statutes specify that the psychological state of the parents, the
relative capacity of the parents and their interest in the child, the permanence of the home,
and the presence of domestic violence are factors to be weighed in the decision-making process. Connecticut lists a total of sixteen factors. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-54(f) (West
2009). Other states with delineated factors include Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.270(2) (West 2017); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 2002); and
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (2015).
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which remain largely unarticulated and unexamined. Moreover, the child’s preference is considered as a single factor, which is often trumped by the recognition
of parental rights.82
The traditional best interests standard therefore does not address children’s
interests as persons in their own right. The standard has little discernible content
and often operates as a mask for judicial discretion. To the extent it does have
substance, the standard’s conception of “best interests” tends to be deﬁned in
relation to children’s developmental needs and parental rights. Children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy remain largely unarticulated and unexamined.
2. Undue Prioritization of Parental Rights
A foundational commitment to parental rights undergirds the authorities
framework, limiting law’s ability to recognize and further children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy. Under the authorities framework, parents enjoy rights over their children as part of the fundamental due process right to
choose how to live their lives free from governmental control.83 Notably, parental rights are doctrinally rooted in parents’ own autonomy interests, not in their
responsibility for furthering children’s interests, broadly construed. Although
some contemporary scholars argue that strong enforcement of parental rights is
the best way to serve children’s interests,84 the interests served are narrowly deﬁned and typically not at the forefront of the decision-making process.
Indeed, when parental rights come into play, children’s interests generally
drop out of the equation altogether. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, a
biological father claimed that California’s presumption of paternity—which assigned paternal rights to the husband of a married woman over the biological
father—was unconstitutional.85 The Supreme Court held that a biological father
does not have constitutionally-recognized parental rights to a relationship with
a child when the mother is married to another man. More importantly, the Court
rejected the child’s claim to a relationship with her biological father, viewing the
biological father’s right and the child’s interests as two sides of the same coin.86
If the biological father could not assert a right to maintain a relationship with his
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

For other critiques of the best interests standard, see Chambers, supra note 80; and Jon Elster,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13, at 636.
491 U.S. 110, 113 (1988).
Id. at 130-31.
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child, the Court reasoned, then the child had no parallel cognizable interest in a
relationship with him.87
Parental rights often receive controlling weight, decentering and devaluing
children in legal analyses. For example, in Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court
rejected a Washington State statute that allowed courts to grant visitation rights
to third parties over the objection of custodial parents if that “visitation may
serve the best interests of the child.”88 At the center of the dispute in Troxel were
two young girls whose father had committed suicide. The paternal grandparents, who had a close relationship with the girls, sought visitation rights beyond
the monthly visits the mother was willing to allow. The plurality opinion written
by Justice O’Connor held that the statute violated parents’ rights to “the care,
custody, and control of their children.”89 In this context, O’Connor concluded,
the mother’s rights prevailed over any consideration of the children’s interests in
maintaining closer contact with their grandparents—the primary link to their
deceased father and important ﬁgures in the children’s lives.
Although parental rights may indirectly further children’s interests, they are
a circuitous and unreliable means of doing so. Parental rights construct children
predominantly as objects of control, rather than as people with values and interests of their own. Indeed, in face-offs between parental rights and children’s
rights, parents almost always win. In both Michael H. and Troxel, for example,
the Supreme Court majorities did not take children’s interests into account in
any meaningful way. Parental rights maintain their hold on the American legal
imagination, even as many parents are overwhelmed by the demands of an expansive and exclusive notion of parental childrearing authority and rely on others to help perform childrearing duties.90
All this is not to say that parental rights should play no role in children’s lives.
Parental rights may foster pluralism and diversity among families, protecting
children from state standardization and indoctrination.91 They also clearly further parents’ own interests in raising their children free from governmental control. They promote children’s interests in developing and maintaining close, stable attachment relationships with caregivers, particularly in the early years. And

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
530 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 65.
See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 390 (2008).
See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958-59
(1993); Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994).
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ﬁnally, parental rights serve children’s interests because parents often know what
is best for their children. Yet under the authorities framework, parental rights
have had an outsized inﬂuence, overshadowing conﬂicts within the family as
well as alternative ways of supporting children’s interests. Indeed, many U.S.
policymakers have opposed ratiﬁcation of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child speciﬁcally on the ground that the treaty would undermine parental
authority.92 The United States, in contrast to almost every other country in the
world,93 continues to overprioritize parental rights at the expense of children’s
interests.
3. Perpetuation of the Myth of Nonintervention in the Family
The authorities framework’s strong emphasis on parental rights also perpetuates a myth of nonintervention in the family and particularly in children’s
lives—a myth that does not accurately describe family life and that stands in the
way of developing a robust regime of parental responsibilities to children.94 Under the authorities framework, common-law and constitutional notions of family privacy assign parents control over their children unless and until the state

92.

See, e.g., Shulamit Almog & Ariel L. Bendor, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Meets
the American Constitution: Towards a Supreme Law of the World, 11 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 273, 277
(2004).
93. The United States is currently the only U.N. member state that has not ratiﬁed the Convention, as South Sudan and Somalia ratiﬁed the Convention in recent years. See Hailing Somalia’s
Ratiﬁcation, UN Renews Call for Universalization of Child Rights Treaty, UN NEWS CTR.
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://news.un.org/en/story/2015/10/511312-hailing-somalias-ratiﬁcation-un
-renews-call-universalization-child-rights [http://perma.cc/ZRJ8-RJJ5]; UN Lauds South
Sudan as Country Ratiﬁes Landmark Child Rights Treaty, UN NEWS CTR. (May 4, 2015),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50759#.WcewrkyZNE4 [http://perma
.cc/EBB7-NDK5].
94. Some scholars rightly focus less on parental rights and more on parental and state duties to
care for children. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 13, at 2415; Soo Jee Lee, Note, A Child’s
Voice vs. a Parent’s Control: Resolving a Tension Between the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 690 (2017). These scholars argue for the importance
of recognizing and developing law’s treatment of children—particularly young children—as
vulnerable individuals in need of support, care, and protection. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 820 (2009). Although framed in terms of children’s welfare and adult
duties to children, the attention to hierarchical relationships of control continues unabated,
as does the question of which adults—parents or the state—carry responsibilities for children.
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intervenes.95 Such privacy is commonly understood to place families—and children—beyond the reach of law.96 In fact, it is conventional wisdom to assume
that law is irrelevant to children unless they are subject to a state’s abuse and
neglect jurisdiction, have been adjudicated delinquent, or are involved in custody
proceedings.
Despite this narrative of nonintervention, law in fact regulates children’s lives
on a daily basis. The authorities framework generally renders this regulation invisible, but two modes of analysis bring it to light: ﬁrst, an examination of the
law affecting children’s lives outside of the traditional domain of the authorities
framework; and second, an examination of the ways in which decisions not to
regulate do in fact have regulatory effects.
First, the ﬁeld of children and law currently considers only some of the laws
affecting children’s lives. For example, a leading casebook organizes law’s regulation of children by type of authority and location, with parental authority governing in the home and state parens patriae authority governing in schools and
in the juvenile justice system. 97 But law mediates children’s interactions with
multiple actors in multiple spheres across public and private divides. For example, law often dictates when children may work for wages, when they may enter
into enforceable contracts, how they may access social media, to which advertisements they may be subject, how they may manage property, when they must
be vaccinated, what they must waive to participate in sports and other activities,

95.

These notions of privacy go beyond individual parental rights to encompass the family as a
whole. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 91, at 963 (“[S]ince the early part of this century, the family
has been accorded independent constitutional protection independent of the liberties enjoyed
by its individual members.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 966 (1991) (“The common law privacy doctrine is not an individualized concept . . . : it attaches to the entity of the family, not to the
individuals that compose it.”). For further discussion of the interplay between constitutional
and common-law notions of family privacy, see Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 864-67.
96. Indeed, Bruce Hafen has described such privacy as “plenary,” meaning parental power “prevail[s] over the claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there
is some compelling justiﬁcation for interference.” Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the
New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L.
REV. 605, 617. Of course, such privacy is not enjoyed by all families equally. See, e.g., Dorothy
Roberts, The Dialectic of Privacy and Punishment in the Gendered Regulation of Parenting, 5 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 200 (2009); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1580-81 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); and JILL QUADAGNO, THE
COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)).
97. HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra note 68, at 3-4. For another leading casebook, see DOUGLAS E.
ABRAMS ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 2017).
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and how daycares and summer camps must be structured.98 When these broader
forms of regulation are taken into account, we see that law mediates children’s
experiences on a daily and ongoing basis, even if most children and their families
never end up in court. By failing to offer a satisfying account of the legal regulation of children’s lives apart from their involvement in hierarchical relationships
of control with parents and state actors, the authorities framework obscures
these other forms of regulation. In doing so, it perpetuates the myth that law
generally does not affect children’s lives and that, when it does, it is largely a
subset of family law.
Second, the authorities framework fails to fully examine the effects of its myopic focus on the hierarchical parent-child relationship. The authorities framework posits the parent-child relationship and parental authority as natural and
preexisting, with law entering the relationship only when courts or government
agencies explicitly intervene. Yet both the recognition of the parent-child relationship and the grant of parental rights are state decisions.99 Parental authority
also ﬂows from laws specifying that children lack the legal capacity to make most
decisions on their own.100 Parental rights and family privacy are therefore always
already “constituted and regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a
domain of autonomous judgment that can come into conﬂict with law.”101 In
other words, a state’s decision not to regulate most parent-child relationships is
itself a form of regulation. By respecting parental rights and family privacy, law
touches every child’s life. This involvement constructs children as objects of parental control. By failing to recognize such regulation, the authorities framework
perpetuates the myth that the law does not intervene in children’s lives, both
inaccurately describing family life and limiting the potential of law to better serve
children’s interests.

98.

See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 9, at 526-28; Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 287 (2006); Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34; Jonathan Todres,
Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012).
99. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 276 (1990) (“Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in the family,
laws governing the family deﬁne the kinds of families the state approves.”); Dailey, supra note
91, at 1000.
100. See Minow, supra note 68, at 4.
101. JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 352 (1994).
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4. Reliance on Limited Conceptions of Dependency and Autonomy
Finally, the authorities framework fails on its own terms to the extent it embraces limited conceptions of dependency and autonomy. Its consistent focus on
children as developing persons produces a system premised on a greater degree
of dependency than children may actually experience.102 Moreover, some forms
of children’s dependency are direct consequences of the law, forcing children to
rely on their parents when they otherwise might not. For example, because children generally are not permitted to engage in wage labor103 or to consent to medical care,104 they are dependent on adults to perform those functions for them.
In this respect, a child’s legal status as a “child” overrides all other potentially
relevant individualized factors, like the actual age, maturity, or dependency of
the particular child.105
Here it may be useful to consider how law has both addressed and constructed dependency in other contexts. Disability, for example, is an apparently
objective condition that nonetheless has been shaped by the law’s ability-disability binary in profound ways.106 An impairment is constructed as a disability
only against law’s assessment of what it means to be “able-bodied.” Marital status, too, once constructed dependency by conferring virtually all legal rights on
husbands, purportedly for the beneﬁt and protection of wives.107 Although this
legal regime was, in part, a response to dependencies arising from childbearing
and childrearing, that response also shaped perceptions of women’s abilities both

102.

103.
104.

105.
106.
107.

See BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 3 (1993) (“[T]he concept of
‘socialization’ moves mostly in one direction. Adults are said to socialize children, teachers
socialize students, the more powerful socialize, and the less powerful get socialized. Power,
indeed, is central to all these relationships, but children, students, the less powerful are by no
means passive or without agency.”).
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Children generally need their parents’ consent for medical care, although exceptions have
been made in the context of “mature minors,” as well as the treatment of alcoholism, drug
addiction, sexually transmitted diseases, and other similar contexts. See, e.g., Jennifer L.
Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right To Make Decisions Regarding
Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996); Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
311.
See Minow, supra note 68; Minow, supra note 13.
See generally Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011).
See Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exception and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 n.11 (1986) (“Before the passage of the Married Women’s Property
Acts, a married woman was unable to sue or be sued, enter into contracts, make wills, retain
her own earnings, or manage her own property.”).
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in and out of the home. By virtue of law, women were thought to lack the constitution to work long hours in factories and the capacity to vote. It took centuries for courts and legislatures to reject these limitations as legal and social constructs not reﬂective of real differences between men and women.108 Today, the
law of marriage and divorce continues to respond to the dependencies of
childbearing and childrearing, but in a way that better reﬂects the coexistence of
dependence and autonomy with respect to both spouses.109
Children’s dependencies, of course, are much more a function of biological
age or maturity than are the dependencies of spouses or people with disabilities.
At birth, children are completely dependent on adults, and only over time do
they acquire the mental and physical capabilities to pursue more independent
courses of action. Yet the dependency of infants and young children masks important aspects of children’s experiences that are not controlled by their developmental status. And by relying on a one-dimensional understanding of children as either dependent or autonomous beings, the authorities framework fails
to recognize and value children’s capacities as agents of their own lives even at
relatively young ages.110
The authorities framework also offers an impoverished conception of autonomy. Under that framework, autonomy acts as an on-off switch, obscuring the
fact that certain capacities for independent thought and action—what we might
call “agency”—often exist alongside dependency.111 Consider an especially stark
example: the case of a young adolescent girl who herself becomes a mother. In
most states, she will be considered a dependent vis-à-vis her own parents—without power, for example, to make educational decisions for herself. But she will
nevertheless likely have parental control over healthcare decisions for her baby.
Similarly, children might have strongly held views about bodily privacy or about
their choice of friends in school, despite being dependent on their parents in
other ways. The authorities framework leaves little room for law to develop a

108.

See Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 2.
109. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways To End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 1227 (discussing the partnership theory of marriage).
110. See THORNE, supra note 102, at 3; Prout & James, supra note 76, at 8; Buss, supra note 10, at
34.
111. Scott, supra note 76, at 547; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1627 (1992) (discussing the scientiﬁc evidence on adolescent decision-making competence).
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vision of children’s agency within multidimensional relationships of which their
dependency is only one small part.112
Moreover, autonomy as a basis for children’s rights goes only so far. The authorities framework presumes that autonomous decision making is the precondition for children’s rights. In this way, the framework deﬁnes children’s rights
just as constitutional law deﬁnes adult rights—as negative liberties protecting a
sphere of autonomous decision-making.113 So long as children are treated as dependents, they are presumptively excluded from the class of rights-holders.114
The authorities framework thus fails to acknowledge an alternative, positive
conception of rights better suited to furthering children’s unique interests as children. This exclusive focus on negative liberty provides yet another reason why
the United States remains the only member nation not to ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 115 a treaty granting children affirmative
rights to certain fundamental goods such as healthcare, education, and housing.
Notably missing from the authorities framework, then, is any robust, comprehensive vision of children’s affirmative rights. At the state level, children may
claim the right to education, but not much else. 116 Almost all governmental
goods and services are governmental beneﬁts—as opposed to entitlements—extended at the discretion of the state.117 The authorities framework’s equation of
rights with autonomy excludes children’s affirmative claims to maintain certain
relationships or to receive certain services and goods to secure their present and
future well-being. In fact, the Supreme Court has made it exceedingly clear that
the U.S. Constitution confers no affirmative entitlements on children,118 a position directly at odds with the broader interests of children set forth in Part II and
the new framework we propose in Part III.
112.

113.

114.

115.
116.
117.
118.

At the same time, the authorities framework also fails to recognize the dependency of adults.
See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2181, 2182 (1995).
American constitutional law remains strongly wedded to the view that the Constitution is a
charter of negative liberties, bestowing few positive rights on anyone—adults or children. As
Anne Alstott writes, “So strong is the Court’s ideal of negative liberty, and so extreme is its
skepticism about state power, that it has insulated the state from any responsibility to protect
children—even against vicious and foreseeable parental attacks.” Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism
in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 25 (2014).
See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 54 (2d ed. 2004); JAMES G. DWYER,
THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 291-92 (2006); THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
See supra note 93.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-174.
See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 113, at 41-42.
Id.; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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***
The authorities framework does more than fail to reﬂect certain features of
children’s lives; it also shapes children’s lives by signaling that aspects of their
lives beyond dependency and autonomy are, or should be, unimportant to children, parents, and the state. The authorities framework therefore constitutes
children as lesser adults, leading to a legal regime grounded in a distorted vision
of children’s lives, parental rights, and the potential for state support of families.
As we explain in the next Part, law can and should expand its conception of
children’s interests beyond dependency and autonomy. While children are diverse in many ways, they share relational interests beyond hierarchical relationships of control. All children have present, noninstrumental interests, desires,
experiences, and needs. By moving beyond the authorities framework’s shortcomings, a broader conception of children’s lives in the here and now comes into
view.
ii. children’s interests in the here and now
The new law of the child set forth in the rest of this Article demonstrates why
law should, as a prescriptive matter, regulate children’s lives based on a clearly
articulated, broad range of children’s interests. Our analysis is powered by a vision of children living meaningful lives in the here and now—a vision drawn
from developmental literature, scholarship on children and law, and what we
take to be the best of judicial decision making. Children’s lives encompass an
array of experiences outside the developmental trajectory that moves children
from dependency to autonomy. This Part identiﬁes these broader, more inclusive
interests, specifying the nuanced ways in which they intersect with—but often
transcend—dependency and autonomy concerns.
This Part identiﬁes ﬁve fundamental interests that we believe best capture
children’s experience in the here and now. These are children’s interests in: (1)
parental and nonparental relationships; (2) exposure to new ideas; (3) expressions of identity; (4) personal integrity and privacy; and (5) participation in civic
life. These ﬁve interests are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as a
starting point for further inquiry by courts, legislatures, and scholars. We are
cognizant of the fact that any compilation of children’s interests cannot be deﬁnitive or absolute. What we present here is a provisional account, open to debate
and revision. By setting forth our best rendering of children’s broader interests,
we hope to stimulate that debate.
The discussion that follows acknowledges and embraces diversity among
children. Children’s interests vary from child to child, are deeply situational, and
change with the passage of time. The authorities framework’s narrow focus on
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parental rights and children’s dependency has prevented law from more fully attending to children’s differences. Parental rights in particular, while justiﬁed in
part on the ground that freedom from governmental control will promote family
diversity and social pluralism,119 reinforce a norm of governmental nonintervention that prevents law from recognizing differing needs and privileges among
children. Children’s economic, racial, religious, gender, and other differences are
lost under a legal framework designed to promote adult authority over all else.
Our approach, in contrast, resists the impulse to essentialize children or parents,
instead acknowledging the diverse ways children experience the interests we
identify.
In articulating children’s broader interests in the here and now, this Part lays
the foundation for a radical reworking of the ﬁeld of children and law while also
reinvigorating existing standards. As explained in Part I, the authorities framework’s narrow conception of children’s interests has produced a weak and largely
ineffectual “best interests of the child” standard that typically gives way in the
face of parental rights. Our approach aims to transform the best interests standard into a robust mechanism for evaluating and weighing children’s broader interests in legislative, administrative, and judicial decision making, with parental
rights coming into play only to the extent that they advance those interests in a
particular case.120 Thus we retain the phrase “best interests standard” as a useful
legal term that allows for balancing children’s broad interests in the context of
legislative, administrative, and judicial decision making.
Our account of children’s lives resonates to some extent with the work of
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their path-breaking 1973
book, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.121 Like their approach to child custody
“from the child’s vantage point,”122 our new law of the child seeks to go “beyond”
the existing categories of autonomy and dependency to capture the richness, diversity, and uniqueness of children’s experience as children. Although Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit importantly focused on children’s emotional connections to

119.

See supra note 91.
120. Our approach shares certain attributes with the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
However, the Convention—while focused on children’s broad interests—makes no attempt to
reconcile competing concerns, to organize children’s interests into a coherent framework, or
to explain how the application of the rights it conveys would be operationalized. Moreover,
the Convention stays exclusively within a rights framework, whereas our approach promotes
children’s interests more broadly. Nevertheless, the new law of the child is in harmony with
the U.N. Convention, and we would support ratiﬁcation of the treaty by the United States.
121. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
122. Id. at 49.
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others in light of children’s sense of time and perspective on the world, they remained tied to a theory of development that emphasized children’s relationship
with their “psychological parent” above all others.123 The new law of the child
aims to revive Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s child-centered, psychologically attuned perspective while at the same time recognizing the value of children’s varying relationships and experiences. Ultimately, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit did
not break free of the authorities framework’s emphasis on parents’ rights as the
touchstone for children and the law. It is precisely this paradigmatic centering of
parental control that our new law of the child leaves behind.
We thus seek to directly promote the diversity of children’s broader interests
without sacriﬁcing core legal protections for parental rights and family privacy.
This Part ﬁrst sets out the normative foundation for the recognition of these
broader interests and then examines each of the ﬁve interests in turn.
A. Normative Foundations
Our vision of children’s broader interests embodies prescriptive goals for
children’s lives under the law. We seek to better capture who children are in an
empirical sense, but we also aim to build a normative account of children under
the law. The new law of the child is attentive to parental rights and the developmental needs of children, while also focusing on children’s distinct abilities,
needs, and experiences as children. In particular, our approach recognizes and
promotes children’s capacities to develop relationships; explore the world of
ideas; express their identities; feel secure in their bodily integrity and personal
privacy; and be fulﬁlled through work and political engagement.
This elaboration of broader interests breaks free from the limitations of the
authorities framework we identiﬁed in Part I. In addition to promoting children’s
broader interests, we draw attention to law’s involvement in all dimensions of
family life, beginning with legal deﬁnitions of childhood and the assignment of
children to their biological parents’ custody. The elaboration of children’s
broader interests also eschews easy binaries such as the dependency-autonomy
polarity that currently structures the authorities framework. We emphasize that
children experience agency within dependency, while acknowledging that children’s present interests are always ﬁltered through the lens of their future lives
as adults.
To that end, we acknowledge the difficulty of labeling the interests we wish
to promote. In many ways, they may be described as children’s present interests in
contrast to the developmental interests at the core of the authorities framework.
123.

See id. at 17-20.
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Children have interests as children, separate from and in addition to their interest in developing into autonomous adults.124 At the same time, describing these
interests as present interests risks setting up a false binary between present and
future interests. Children, like adults, experience the present while looking toward the future.125 They experience a range of emotions and pursue a range of
purposes, some of which are related to the concerns and aspirations of their future selves as they are imagined in the present. By emphasizing that children’s
present and future interests are inextricably linked, the new law of the child helps
to unseat the prevailing dependency-autonomy binary, whereby children are
viewed either as dependent on adults or as autonomous individuals nearing
adulthood.
We thus refer to the broad range of children’s interests presented in this Part
as children’s “broader interests” or “interests in the here and now.” Of course,
children’s developmental needs and experiences—their interest in becoming future adults—are not excluded from our analysis. But, while developmental concerns are relevant and should be taken into account, adult autonomy is not the
endpoint of the analysis nor the only foundation for children’s rights. We therefore distinguish our analysis from that of commentators emphasizing children’s
right to an “open future.”126 These commentators focus on eliminating barriers
to children’s future choices as adults, but they fail to recognize that children also
have robust interests in the here and now, well before those futures are realized.
Our account of children’s broader interests aligns with fundamental commitments and aspirations already embedded in American law and legal discourse.

124.

See, e.g., CHRIS JENKS, CHILDHOOD 32-51 (1996).
In fact, given existing social and legal conceptions of childhood, it would be impossible for
children to experience the present without regard to their future as adults because their very
classiﬁcation as children is deﬁned against that eventual status. See, e.g., Leena Alanen, Generational Order, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF CHILDHOOD STUDIES 159 (Jens Qvortrup,
William A. Corsaro & Michael-Sebastian Honig eds., 2009); Maria Grahn-Farley, A Theory of
Child Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867, 871-74 (2003).
126. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, The Child’s Right to an Open Future: Yoder and Beyond, 26 CAP. U. L.
REV. 93 (1997); John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
161, 170 (1986) (arguing that children’s rights should reﬂect the idea that children’s “capacities
are to be developed to their best advantage”); Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124,
125-26 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (identifying children’s “rights-in-trust”
or “anticipatory autonomy rights,” deﬁned as a child’s right “to have . . . future options kept
open until he is a fully formed self-determining adult capable of deciding among them”).
Justice Douglas, in his famous dissent in Yoder, foreshadowed these “future rights” theories
when he proclaimed that “the future of the student” was imperiled by the majority’s decision
to allow the Amish to keep their children out of school beyond the sixth grade. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125.
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Recognition of the central value of intimate relationships in human affairs has a
long history in constitutional law and commentary.127 Law has come to deﬁne
the sphere of adult intimate relationships in terms of parenting, sexuality, and
marriage; this normative understanding of relationships as central to human
ﬂourishing applies equally if not more so to children. Similarly, children’s interest in exposure to new ideas resonates with many of the same values underlying
adults’ rights to free expression and access to ideas.128 Adult interests in bodily
integrity and personal privacy—interests that children share—are also an established ﬁxture of American law.129 And the right to participate in civic life, most
notably through voting, has a long, albeit contested, history in which children
can and should be recognized.130
To be clear, we do not simply seek to transfer a regime of adult liberal values
to children. Our normative account of children’s interests goes well beyond an
understanding of the core values that animate law’s regulation of persons more
generally. The governing liberal ideal for adults—the principle of individual autonomy—plays a lesser role in our scheme of children’s interests. In contrast to
127.

Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court has focused
on the realm of intimate relationships as a core protected sphere under the Due Process
Clause. Commentators, too, have offered a normative defense of a right of intimate association
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE L. J. 624, 629-37 (1980). More recently, the Court has recognized the right of samesex couples to engage in sexual activity, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and to
marry, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). And parental rights, while protecting
a realm of adult authority, also reﬂect the value of intimate relationships in adult life. See Buss,
supra note 13, at 655-56.
128. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right To Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4; William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right To
Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 323-26.
129. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-99 (1989); see also Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding a state law requiring clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes for removal of life support).
130. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a statute that
limited voting rights based on taxable real property owners and parents or guardians of children enrolled in public schools); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (ﬁnding
a state poll tax unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that two
proposals to apportion seats in the state legislature violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (describing the role of shifting
ideologies in contestations over the right to vote in the United States).
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the authorities framework’s focus on children’s attainment of autonomy, we envision children’s lives freed from the ideal of the autonomous, freely acting adult
individual. We elaborate a new law of the child that better reﬂects the full
breadth of children’s experiences in the here and now, as children and not simply
as future autonomous adults. Some of these interests resonate with the interests
of adults, but some are distinct to children’s interests.
The new law of the child thus exposes an unresolved conundrum within traditional liberal theory: how to account for the interests of children under a legal
regime organized around the fundamental principle of individual autonomy.131
Our approach pushes the liberal legal framework to its limits—or even beyond—
by insisting that children’s interests be given priority over adult autonomy
rights.132 We also break free from a single-minded devotion to a choice framework of rights rooted in the liberal legal ideal of individual autonomy. Older adolescents may lay claim to modiﬁed autonomy rights—what we call agency
rights—but autonomy is not the central concern under our new law of the child.
Instead, we aim to tie children’s rights to adult responsibilities, opening up avenues for recognizing children’s affirmative entitlements to certain goods, services, and access to ideas and people in their lives.
Our new framework thus seeks to build a different normative account of children’s lives that gives rise to new ways of imagining the law’s regulation of children. This normative account will be contested; we aim here only to open a dialogue rather than to impose a ﬁnal, authoritative statement of children’s
treatment in law. Nevertheless, the framework we offer is more than simply one
alternative among many for promoting the interests of children. The new law of
the child represents our best attempt to engender a legal regime that values children as full persons with broad interests and rights of their own.

131.

Rawlsian liberal theorists might argue that the parties in the original position were all once
children themselves, and therefore children’s interests are taken into account vicariously. But
these parties were children in the past; the theory does not explain why they would take children’s interests into account in the here and now. Rawls himself appears to have excluded children from the original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 183 (rev. ed. 1999)
(describing paternalism as the responsibility to “[c]hoose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally”).
132. Our new law of the child might be understood as a reform of classic liberalism or a rejection
altogether—an issue we do not resolve here. For an effort to reform classic liberal theory, see
ANNE ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES
PARENTS 75-100, 141-52 (2004); and Dailey, supra note 13. Cf. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy
to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 805 (1999) (“It
remains an open question whether the feminist inﬂuences I describe will, in fact, ‘reconstruct’
liberal autonomy, or transform it into something else altogether.”).
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B. Children’s Five Broader Interests
The new law of the child expands law’s reach to incorporate a broader range
of interests in the here and now beyond the dependency and autonomy interests
already recognized by law. As already explained, these broader interests encompass developmental needs and goals, as children’s present well-being cannot be
neatly separated from their future aims. We identify and discuss ﬁve interests:
(1) parental and nonparental relationships; (2) exposure to new ideas; (3) expressions of identity; (4) personal integrity and privacy; and (5) participation in
civic life. These ﬁve broader interests are offered here in the spirit of opening a
more focused and sustained dialogue over the present and future well-being of
children.
1. Parental and Nonparental Relationships
Our approach recognizes the importance of children developing a primary
attachment relationship with at least one adult committed to their care over
time.133 Young children need emotional security and care to ensure their wellbeing and development, and the parent-child relationship is the ﬁrst and primary attachment relationship in most children’s lives. Ideally, parental or other
custodial caregivers provide the conditions most likely to produce basic loving
environments for children.134 These attachment relationships have the potential
to foster children’s pleasure and propel their development in physical, emotional,
and cognitive ways.
Law already vigorously protects the parent-child relationship,135 yet it does
so by consistently placing children at the bottom of the vertical parent-child re-

133.

See, e.g, ATTACHMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS AND EMERGING THEMES
(Jeffrey A. Simpson & W. Stephen Rholes eds., 2015); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra
note 121 (developing “psychological parent” theory based on attachment theory).
134. Some argue that parents and the state together have the responsibility to ensure that every
child be loved. See, e.g., Luara Ferracioli, The State’s Duty To Ensure Children Are Loved, 8 J.
ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 15-18 (2014); see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of
Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 795-801 (2016) (arguing that the state should recognize a
variety of caregiver-child relationships).
135. See supra Part I (critiquing family law’s orientation towards authority over the child).
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lationship, thus focusing primarily on children’s developmental needs and interests. 136 This emphasis on hierarchical relationships undervalues the relationships children form with other children, including siblings and peers, as well as
with noncustodial adults in their lives.
We value the parent-child relationship while also emphasizing that parents
are not the only important persons in children’s lives. Developmental researchers
study the ways in which “[y]oung children experience their world as an environment of relationships, and these relationships affect virtually all aspects of
their development.”137 Many relationships in children’s lives are not deﬁned by a
legal right to control, as the parent-child relationship is, yet these diverse relationships are important to children’s development. Other relationships are not
necessarily tied to children’s dependency or developmental needs, but they nonetheless play important roles in children’s lives.
With a focus on children’s broader range of relationships, the new law of the
child positions children as more than passive recipients of adult childrearing.
Rather than placing children at the bottom of hierarchical relationships of control, the new law of the child positions children as active participants at the center of a web of multiple relationships, including those with other adults, siblings,
and peers.
a. Relationships with Other Adults
Many children live with adults who are not their legal parents, and all children interact with a diverse group of adults. Law currently recognizes the value
of these relationships with other adults only to the extent that the adults are fulﬁlling a caregiving role similar to parents.138 Stepparents, unmarried partners of

136.

See Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 833-34 (observing the “general principle” in family law that
“absent abuse or other forms of perceived family default, parents enjoy almost complete authority over their children at home, whereas the state may exercise authority over children at
school,” and thus “[w]ith limited exceptions, children have few rights in either realm”).
137. Nat’l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Young Children Develop in an Environment of Relationships 1 (Harvard Ctr. on the Developing Child, Working Paper 1, 2004).
138. Beginning in the 1980s, family law scholars embarked on a law reform project designed to
expand legal notions of the family to include all groups functioning as families even if they
did not enjoy family status. For examples, see Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992); Martha Minow,
Redeﬁning Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (1991); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 576-84; and Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 279-80 (1990). Accordingly, states have increasingly recognized “de facto” parents as family members. See, e.g.,
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legal parents, and a limited number of other adults playing caregiving roles in
children’s lives may therefore enjoy parent-like rights so long as they continue to
function like parents.139
These relationships, while meaningful to many families, reinforce the importance of parental bonds to the exclusion of children’s other relationships with
adults.140 Under the authorities framework, children’s relationships with individuals other than their parents are fully within their parents’ control. Because
children are always within the custody of parents or the state, their relationships
are always controlled by their custodians. Parents largely determine children’s
access to grandparents, former foster parents, paid caregivers, and even some
noncustodial biological parents. 141

Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family: Changing Realities of Parenthood:
The Law’s Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2052, 2054-64 (2003); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) (deﬁning a de facto parent
as a parent who lived with the child and regularly performed a majority or a share of the caretaking functions “for reasons primarily other than ﬁnancial compensation”). A few states also
have permitted children to have three legal parents in limited situations. See Susan Frelich
Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 16-22 (2008).
139. See, e.g., Doug NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017). Not all states
have robustly recognized de facto parents, however. See Michelle E. Kelly, De Facto Parents in
Maryland: When Will the Law Recognize Their Rights?, 46 U. BALT. L.F. 116 (2016); Emily R.
Lipps, Janice M. v. Margaret K.: Eliminating Same-Sex Parents’ Rights To Raise Their Children
by Eliminating the De Facto Parent Doctrine, 68 MD. L. REV. 691 (2009). For unmarried samesex couples as well as some unmarried different-sex couples using assisted reproductive technologies, only one individual will be genetically related to the child; an approach to
parenthood that respects children’s interests in these families will treat both individuals as
parents from the moment of birth. Our primary concern here is with the legal treatment of
children’s relationships with adults who are not their intended parents.
140. The authorities framework also limits recognition of a child’s parents to two persons. Our
approach, which is focused on furthering children’s interests, supports broadening children’s
legally recognized parental relationships beyond the traditional number of two.
141. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (denying grandparents access to children beyond
that allowed by custodial mother); id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that parents have
an interest in choosing their child’s social companions, and therefore have a right to be free of
“judicially compelled visitation” of grandparents over their objections); Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying a biological father rights to a relationship with a child born
to a mother married to another man); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (denying a
biological father the right to veto an adoption when he lacked a developed relationship with
the child); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (denying
foster parents an adversarial hearing before children could be removed to another foster family); Hafen, supra note 96, at 617 (noting that, legally, parental power “prevail[s] over the
claims of the state, other outsiders, and the children themselves unless there is some compelling justiﬁcation for interference”).
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The new law of the child, in contrast, recognizes that relationships with other
adults are central to children’s lives and provide the opportunity for children to
experience more egalitarian, non-instrumental interactions. Parental relationships, while crucial to a child’s well-being and development, are in large part
deﬁned by children’s needs and incapacities. Children’s relationships with nonparental adults, in contrast, may instead center around play, activities, friendship, and other present-oriented aims. For example, children’s lives may be
greatly enriched by relationships with former foster parents and, for adopted
children, by relationships with their biological parents. Children may also beneﬁt from relationships with adults in mentoring roles such as teachers, counselors, and coaches; from relationships with professionals such as social workers,
therapists, and doctors; and from relationships with noncustodial kin such as
grandparents, aunts, and uncles. While many of these adults, such as grandparents, teachers, and therapists, d0 engage in caregiving activities, caregiving is not
always the primary aim of these relationships. Instead these relationships often
center around more egalitarian, noninstrumental interactions and shared activities like play.
Children’s interests in forming and maintaining nonparental relationships
may sometimes conﬂict with parents’ interests in controlling the upbringing of
their children. The authorities framework largely resolves this conﬂict by protecting parental rights to the exclusion of children’s divergent interests. Concern
for children’s well-being underlies this robust protection of parental rights, as
the state traditionally assumes children’s interests coincide with those of their
parents.142 This may often be the case, but children may also have interests outside that zone of alignment. By taking children’s broader interests seriously, the
new law of the child supports giving children greater access to important adults
in their lives, as set forth in more detail in Part III.
b. Relationships with Other Children
Children’s relationships with other children also serve multiple purposes beyond developmental needs. From a very early age, children possess capacities
that help them build relationships with siblings and peers. Children may create

142.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion)
(assuming that the children’s interests coincided with the mother’s interests in limiting paternal grandparent visitation); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (assuming that the daughter’s interests
coincided with the interests of the legally presumed father to the exclusion of the biological
father); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-32 (1972) (assuming that children agreed with
their parents’ opposition to mandatory secondary education).
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rich social worlds with other children both inside and outside the home and
other parent-created spaces.143
Sibling relationships in particular are among children’s most emotionally
powerful and intimate relationships.144 Siblings are a “ﬁxture” in the family lives
of children, and research demonstrates the important role that siblings play “as
companions, conﬁdantes, combatants, and as the focus of social comparisons.” 145 Although sibling relationships are multifaceted and vary across cultures, “[t]hese relationships offer their own psychological beneﬁts, including the
potential for ameliorating the deﬁciencies and disturbances in the child-parent
relationship.” 146 Siblings engage in “pretend play,” “shar[e] an imaginative
world,” and conjecture about the motivations of others, all of which are both
developmentally laden and pleasure-seeking activities.147
Like sibling relationships, children’s peer relationships can play a vital, positive role in their lives, fostering creative play, emotional attachment, and personal experimentation. 148 Peer relationships often expand and enhance children’s present experiences while simultaneously stimulating their intellectual
and emotional growth.149 Over time, peer relationships also provide positive opportunities for group projects, sexual exploration, and other identity-forming
activities.
143.
144.

145.
146.

147.
148.

149.

See THORNE, supra note 102, at 20.
See STEPHEN P. BANK & MICHAEL D. KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND, at xvii (2d ed. 1997); JUDY
DUNN, SISTERS AND BROTHERS (1985); SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE LIFESPAN (Michael E. Lamb & Brian Sutton-Smith eds., 1982); Jill Elaine
Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 903-05 (2012) (discussing cases of siblings
separated by adoption).
See Susan M. McHale et al., Sibling Relationships and Inﬂuences in Childhood and Adolescence, 74
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 913 (2012).
SALMAN AKHTAR, THE DAMAGED CORE: ORIGINS, DYNAMICS, MANIFESTATIONS, AND TREATMENT 28 (2009); see also Salman Akhtar, Early Relationships and Their Internalization, in THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 39, 46 (Ethel S. Person et
al. eds., 2005) (arguing that sibling bonds can inﬂuence “evolving character traits” and exert
lifelong impact on the choice of relationships).
See Judy Dunn, Siblings, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 902, 905 (Richard A.
Shweder et al. eds., 2009).
Some researchers suggest that children’s environments, including their peer relationships,
play a much larger role in their personality development than does parental inﬂuence. See
JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN OUT THE WAY
THEY DO 147-71 (1998); Judith Rich Harris, Where Is the Child’s Environment? A Group Socialization Theory of Development, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 458, 483 (1995).
See MARY GAUVAIN, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 59-61 (2001). Research about children’s learning styles increasingly emphasizes the ways that children may
learn more from their classmates than from their teachers. See, e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN:
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These relationships remind us that “adults are not the sole or even the primary inﬂuence on the lives of most children.”150 Children’s sibling and peer relationships often enable them to experience unique pleasures and purposes outside of hierarchical relationships, even while they are simultaneously subject to
parental or other adult control.151 Children may play a role in the lives of other
children in a way that does not depend on adult or state power, yet which is also
made possible—or impossible—by that power.152 For example, children are dependent on the state or private adults for structuring the social contexts of
schools and other youth organizations and for providing the material conditions
(such as transportation, clothing, and food) that enable them to take advantage
of those relationship-forming opportunities. Furthermore, children’s peer relationships are often segregated along class, gender, racial, and other identity lines,
and parents, teachers, and other adults are in a position to encourage acceptance
and integration.153
The authorities framework generally overlooks children’s interests in relationships with other children, even sibling relationships,154 instead focusing on
them only when they are derivative of the parent-child relationship. For example, if the parent-child relationship falls apart due to abuse or neglect, existing
law focuses on repairing that relationship or ﬁnding a new parental relationship
for the child.155 Children’s interests in their sibling relationships are often secondary, valued only to the extent that they do not interfere with reuniﬁcation or
termination and adoption. Many states do not guarantee that siblings will live

150.
151.

152.

153.

154.

155.

BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL (John D. Bransford et al. eds., 1999); Roger Passman, Experiences with Student-Centered Teaching and Learning in High-Stakes Assessment Environments, 122 EDUC. 189, 196 (2001).
Donna Elder, Peers, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION, supra note 147, at 716.
Cf. Minow, supra note 13, at 297 (noting that the law could easily acknowledge that children
need some forms of freedom but also need “guidance, involvement, support, and even control
to protect them from harms against which they cannot protect themselves”).
Cf. Leena Alanen, Rethinking Childhood, 31 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 53, 58 (1988) (criticizing how
the “intentions and interests of children as participants in their own socialization are effectively excluded” in much sociological discourse about children).
See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, “WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?”: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52-74 (1997); DANIEL YON, ELUSIVE CULTURE: SCHOOLING, RACE, AND IDENTITY IN GLOBAL TIMES 29-31 (2000).
See Hasday, supra note 144, at 902 (noting that “legal interest in sibling relationships is radically underdeveloped”). Inheritance law is an exception, although it tends to focus on adult
siblings. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 369 (2012) (advocating for a
legal regime that allows the children of donor parents to connect with one another); Frances
H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 241-42 (2001).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2012).
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with one another once removed from the home, or that they will even be able to
visit one another if they are adopted into different homes.156 Rather than recognizing the intrinsic importance of sibling relationships, the law largely views
them as a collateral consequence of the parent-child relationship.157
The authorities framework also largely renders invisible children’s positive
relationships with non-sibling peers, tending to treat peer relationships as
sources of dangerous inﬂuence and pressure.158 Of course, the law rightly authorizes state intervention designed to end harmful peer relationships. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to impose tort liability on
schools that fail to protect students from harassment by other students on school
grounds. 159 Many states and school districts also have adopted anti-bullying

156.

See DWYER, supra note 114, at 903, 983 (emphasizing that most states give “children no right
to maintain a relationship with siblings who live in a different household”); Mary Anne Herrick & Wendy Piccus, Sibling Connections: The Importance of Nurturing Sibling Bonds in the Foster Care System, 27 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 845, 856 (2005). This contrasts with children’s
(albeit limited) rights to maintain relationships with parents. David D. Meyer, The Modest
Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1117, 1119 & n.10 (2003).
157. A few state legislatures have given more attention to prioritizing the preservation of sibling
relationships when the state assumes physical custody over children upon a ﬁnding of abuse
or neglect. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.1(g) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-129(j) (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-13(8)(h) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:19-d (LexisNexis 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2013). And the federal
government has attempted to promote sibling visitation during and after foster care. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of October 2008, § 206, Pub. L. No.
110-351, 122 Stat. 3949, 3962 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012)). But these efforts are limited.
See Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster
Care To Maintain Their Relationships Post-Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (2011); Ellen Marrus, Fostering Family Ties: The State as Maker and Breaker of Kinship Relationships, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 319, 324, 333; Ellen Marrus, “Where Have You Been, Fran?”: The Right of Siblings to
Seek Court Access To Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 TENN. L. REV. 977, 995 (1999).
158. For example, this characterization is emphasized in juvenile sentencing decisions like Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (stating that “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative inﬂuences and outside pressures, including peer pressures” in part because they
“have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment”), and in the
First Amendment case, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (“The undeniable fact is
that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”).
159. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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statutes or policies160 and have passed various forms of anti-gang legislation.161
These laws are vitally important for children’s safety and overall well-being. But
they should not eclipse the ways in which children’s positive peer relationships
enrich their lives.
Other forms of state intervention target less obvious harms presumed to ﬂow
from children’s interactions with other children outside of adult supervision. By
passing curfew ordinances that limit the hours in which minors may congregate
outside the home, states aim to prevent potential harm by controlling children’s
interactions with each other.162 These regulations reinforce the primacy of the
parent-child relationship while simultaneously positing children’s relationships
with other children as threatening and unsafe. Similar concerns may be found in
generalized fears about peer pressure.163
Sexual relationships between children are often viewed as particularly threatening. Some states criminalize teen sexual behavior in the hope that potential
sanctions will deter some children (generally boys) from pursuing sex, and will

160.

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2012). For an overview of state approaches,
see DENA T. SACCO, AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-BULLYING LEGISLATION AND OTHER
RELATED LAWS 11 (2012), http://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/ﬁles/State
_Anti_bullying_Legislation_Overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9YE-X6VE]. Such legislation
generally responds to the ways bullying may threaten the state’s ability to control children’s
learning environments, thus reinforcing the authorities framework. See, e.g., Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
161. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2018); see also Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 32-33 (1998) (identifying other state antigang statutes). Such legislation is often motivated by fears that gangs will displace parental
or state control over children. In Oklahoma, for instance, it is a misdemeanor to cause, aid,
abet, or encourage a child to become a “runaway child,” deﬁned in reference to a parent or
custodian’s consent and knowledge. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West 2015).
162. See Gregory Z. Chen, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1997). Children are generally permitted in public after curfew hours
only when accompanied by a parent, when engaging in an organized activity approved of by
a parent, or when running an errand for a parent. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia,
188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 49395 (5th Cir. 1993); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Iowa 1989).
163. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 148, at 147-71. Many legal commentators are concerned with the
dynamics of peer pressure. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 78, at 1002-11. But other commentators
overlook it given their focus on parents and the state. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Pluralism: A
Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 327 (2007) (emphasizing that
“[t]wo major sources of assimilation demands on children are their parents and the state”
without acknowledging that children can also assert assimilation demands on one another).
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encourage other children (generally girls) to resist.164 State laws also often stigmatize teenage reproduction while simultaneously denying adolescents the
means to manage the reproductive and health consequences of sexual relationships. Some states, for example, pursue policies designed to isolate teenage
mothers from other children by encouraging them to attend alternative educational programs,165 or by segregating them from other children when they are in
state custody. 166 Yet many states offer only limited sex education in public
schools, and no state mandates that schools provide children with condoms or
other forms of contraception.167 Even when states acknowledge that adolescents
are unlikely to defer sex, they focus on preventing this perceived harm rather
than acknowledging the present positive experiences of sex for most adolescents.
In contrast, the new law of the child takes account of children’s broader interests
in maintaining positive relationships with other children throughout childhood.

164.

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
142-46 (2d ed. 2004) (detailing state “age of consent” laws); see also Michelle Fine, Sexuality,
Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29
(1988) (arguing that the anti-sex rhetoric surrounding sex education does little to enhance
the development of sexual responsibility and subjectivity in adolescents). The Bush Administration made the gendered assumptions beyond these laws explicit in both its marriagepromotion policies and its restrictions on federal sex education funding. See LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 13538, 256-89 (2006). But children are often not prosecuted under such statutes. The few prosecutions that occur may be motivated by concerns about particular sexual practices, including
those between same-sex partners and partners of different races and those that result in pregnancy. See, e.g., Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.
Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff ’d, 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998).
165. See Amber Hausenﬂuck, A Pregnant Teenager’s Right to Education in Texas, 9 SCHOLAR 151, 16983 (2006); Kate Giammarise, Alternative-School Leader Helps Girls To Develop Life Skills, BLADE
(Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.toledoblade.com/Education/2008/09/18/Alternative-school
-leader-helps-girls-to-develop-life-skills.html [http://perma.cc/4HMC-LCYB]. Some public school districts even operated separate schools for pregnant girls until relatively recently.
See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Schools for Pregnant Girls, Relic of 1960s New York, Will Close,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/education/24educ.html
[http://perma.cc/9ZWB-GJWS].
166. See Lauren Silver, Minding the Gap: Adolescent Mothers Navigate Child Welfare, 82 SOC. SERV.
REV. 615 (2008).
167. Some states have also charged children with violations of child pornography laws when they
send sexually explicit texts to one another, even when they are sending their own images to
their peers. See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor
Leary, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505 (2008).
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2. Exposure to New Ideas
Children also ﬂourish emotionally and intellectually when they are exposed
to new ideas. Of course, all ideas are new to an infant; we are focused primarily
on children’s access to ideas as they age. By “new ideas,” we mean ideas different
from those that a child encounters in the home; depending on the family, new
ideas might, in fact, be socially traditional ideas. At times, these new ideas ﬂow
from the relationships described above, for it is through individuals outside the
home that children discover new ideas. At other times, children are exposed to
new ideas through group activities and other social settings beyond the family.
For many children, teachers, mentors, peers, and extra-curricular activities may
be the primary source of exposure to new ideas.
Exposure to new ideas furthers a range of children’s interests, including intellectual learning, creative explorations, social pleasures, and new ways of viewing the world. The authorities framework recognizes some of these interests but
generally values children’s exposure to new ideas only to the extent it helps prepare children for future lives as autonomous adult citizens. As the Supreme
Court noted in Board of Education v. Pico, “access [to ideas] prepares students for
active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in
which they will soon be adult members.”168 As such, school officials may not impede children’s access to library books simply because those officials believe such
exposure would be harmful or foster discord.169 In a similar vein, the Third Circuit has held that schools may not limit student speech on social networking sites
if students did not intend for the speech to reach the school and there is no reasonable forecast that the speech would cause substantial disruption at school.170
The authorities framework thus protects children’s exposure to new ideas if
that exposure prepares children to become autonomous, mature, economically
self-reliant members of a liberal democratic society. Children’s interest in education therefore has been a bedrock of the ﬁeld of children and law for close to a

168.

457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982).
See id.; see also Case v. Uniﬁed Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kans. 1995); Counts
v. Cedarville Sch. Dist., 295 F. Supp. 2d 996 (W.D. Ark. 2003).
170. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015) (holding that the school district could not expel
a student for an online post about a teacher); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community
Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that the defendant could not suspend students from extracurricular activities for posting provocative photographs on the internet).
169.
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century. Although the Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental interest protected by the U.S. Constitution,171 every state guarantees a
free public education,172 and the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe held that this
right must extend to undocumented immigrant children on the same terms as
other children.173 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on past decisions
recognizing “public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation
of a democratic system of government,”174 and “as the primary vehicle for transmitting ‘the values on which our society rests.’”175 The Court also relied on Wisconsin v. Yoder to emphasize that “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant
and self-sufficient participants in society.”176 Lower courts have addressed the
states’ interest in exposing children to new ideas as conducive to “teaching fundamental values ‘essential to a democratic society,’” including tolerance.177
These developmental concerns are vitally important to children and their
well-being, but they reﬂect only one dimension of the value of exposure to new
ideas for children. The new law of the child emphasizes that exposure also
broadens and enriches children’s experiences in the here and now. Children are
stimulated by new ideas: they enjoy humor, learning, experimenting, and exploring. Even at very young ages, children possess a capacity for initiating rela-

171.
172.

173.

174.
175.

176.
177.

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See, e.g., CONN. CONST., art. VIII, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does
not impose obligations on states to fund public schools equally, see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, but
state constitutions often require more in the way of funding than the federal Constitution, see,
e.g., CONN. CONST., art VIII, § 4. Many state legislatures also have adopted public school
funding formulas that require some degree of wealth-equalization across school districts. See
Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94
VA. L. REV. 1963, 1971-72 (2008).
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006) (offering a constitutional theory for educational adequacy).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37
(emphasizing that public schools “provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in
the political process” once they become adults).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987).
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tionships and activities and for choosing how to live their lives within the parameters given to them. They are young scientists as well as philosophers, investigating the world around them.178
Children’s abilities to respond to new ideas may be different from those of
adults, but they are no less important. Children’s abilities are perhaps most
clearly illustrated in the context of their pretend play, where children deploy
heightened powers of imagination to create new worlds, to connect with and
control other people, to learn that other people have minds, and to consider
choices among varying alternatives.179 Exposure to new ideas enriches this play,
as children are given the tools to imagine new possibilities for their lives both in
the present and for the future.
Of course, children’s present interests in exposure to new ideas do not eclipse
their developmental interests as future citizens. To the contrary, the two are intimately connected. Children’s exposure to new ideas enriches the present in part
because of its developmental thrust. Children’s exploration of the world of ideas
both nurtures their present needs and desires as children and helps prepare them
to become adult members of a liberal polity that values individual autonomy,
tolerance, and pluralism.180 Acknowledging this interplay and ﬂuidity between
children’s present and developmental interests strengthens the importance of
children’s exposure to new ideas.
Schools are crucial to the task of exposing children to new ideas, for as the
Supreme Court has stated, the classroom is “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”181 Although public school children cannot be forced to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance, or actively affirm any allegiance at all,182 children may be required

178.

179.

180.
181.
182.

See ALLISON GOPNIK, THE SCIENTIST IN THE CRIB: WHAT EARLY LEARNING TELLS US ABOUT
THE MIND (2000); Allison James, Andrew N. Meltzoff & Patricia K. Kuhl, Children as Philosophers, in RETHINKING CHILDHOOD, supra note 76.
See JANET W. ASTINGTON, PAUL L. HARRIS & DAVID R. OLSON, DEVELOPING THEORIES OF
MIND (1988); PETER FONAGY ET AL., AFFECT REGULATION, MENTALIZATION, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF (2002). Play is not merely developmental but is also a part of children’s
current well-being and can help them process past experiences and traumas: “In metaphorically representing events that were originally threatening, children are able to take an active
stance to control events in the reenactment, contributing a sense of empowerment or mastery
over what was once unresolved and unsettling.” Cindy Dell Clark, Play Therapy, ENCYCLOPEDIA ON EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://www.child-encyclopedia.com/play
/according-experts/play-therapy [http://perma.cc/VGZ6-JVB8].
See Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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to listen to or read material at odds with their (or their parents’) beliefs.183 Yet
under the authorities framework, parents generally control the extent of children’s access to ideas outside the home. For example, thirty-ﬁve states allow parents to withdraw their children from sex education classes.184 Children are not
even required to attend school: homeschooling is allowed in every state, and regulations are relatively minimal.185
How to strike the appropriate balance between fostering children’s interests
in the parent-child relationship and their interests in exposure to new ideas is
not clear-cut, but such balance will never be achieved if children’s broader interests are ignored. Children have developmental interests in becoming adult members of society while also having present interests in exposure to new ideas that
foster their engagement in the world around them. Once these multiple interests
are acknowledged, we then have the opportunity to better promote them, as set
forth in more detail in Part III.
3. Expressions of Identity
A child’s sense of self and belonging emerges early on and both strengthens
and changes with age.186 This evolving sense of identity is ﬁrst and continuously
forged through children’s relationships with their parents, but children’s identities are also always to some degree independent of parental inﬂuence.187 Children, like adults, learn about themselves and others as they discover that people

183.
184.
185.

186.

187.

See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination,
and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1993).
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.016 (2016).
See Homeschooling Regulations by State, PROPUBLICA (2015), http://projects.propublica.org
/graphics/homeschool [http://perma.cc/N8JV-SAJV]; see also Timothy Brandon Waddell,
Note, Bringing It All Back Home: Establishing a Coherent Constitutional Framework for the Reregulation of Homeschooling, 63 VAND. L. REV. 541, 596-97 (2010) (discussing the relaxed regulation of homeschooling in many states).
See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). See generally Catherine R. Cooper,
Rachel Behrens & Nancy M. Trinh, Identity, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION,
supra note 147, at 474-77; Elaine Reese et al., Emerging Identities: Narrative and Self from Early
Childhood to Early Adolescence, in NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE: CREATING THE
STORIED SELF 23 (Kate C. McLean & Monisha Pasupathi eds., 2009).
Psychoanalysts traditionally describe this process of identity formation in Oedipal terms. See,
e.g., ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 212-15
(2017); Hans W. Loewald, The Waning of the Oedipus Complex, 27 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC
ASS’N 751, 757 (1979) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say that the assumption of responsibility for
one’s own life and its conduct is in psychic reality tantamount to the murder of the parents,
to the crime of parricide.”).
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in their lives possess diverse beliefs, affiliations, and lifestyles. Children also experience a range of emotions as they explore how they belong, or might belong,
to various groups around them.188 This exploration affects children’s daily lives
as much as it affects their futures, if not more.189
The authorities framework does not acknowledge that children have present
interests in developing and expressing identities, commitments, and values. Instead, the authorities framework focuses on children’s future identities as adults,
suggesting that children’s identities are on hold until they reach the age of majority,190 and emphasizing concerns about parental indoctrination. In this view,
parental indoctrination works because children lack the capacity to develop their
own values and commitments.191 To set limits on parental indoctrination, the
authorities framework aims to keep aspects of children’s character unformed until the age of majority, when young adults are able to choose who they are for
themselves. Under the prevailing view, then, law often affirmatively denies children’s interests in expressing their identities in favor of children’s ultimate interests in becoming autonomous adult citizens.
Yet the idea that children’s identity formation is on hold is obviously a ﬁction.
Children from the earliest age have an evolving sense of identity that they express across multiple forums, including home, school, and the many spaces in
between.192 These expressions of identity implicate multiple intersecting traits,

188.

189.
190.

191.

192.

Catherine R. Cooper et al., Beyond Demographic Categories: How Immigration, Ethnicity, and
“Race” Matter for Children’s Identities and Pathways Through School, in DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS THROUGH MIDDLE CHILDHOOD: RETHINKING CONTEXTS AND DIVERSITY AS RESOURCES
181, 200 (Catherine R. Cooper et al. eds., 2005).
See, e.g., THORNE, supra note 102, at 11-28; Anca Gheaus, Unﬁnished Adults and Defective Children: On the Nature and Value of Childhood, 9 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 5-6, 8-14 (2015).
See, e.g., Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex
Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361, 363 (2007) (“The law presumes
that parents will act in the best interest of their minor children, so that parents’ decisions
about whether a transgender adolescent will receive sex reassignment treatment can effectively
act as ‘an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto’ over the adolescent’s identity and physical selfdetermination until the adolescent turns eighteen.”). The Supreme Court embraced this view
in Prince v. Massachusetts, when it declared: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But they are not free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.” 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
Relatedly, philosopher Tamar Schapiro argues that children lack the capacity for moral agency,
which justiﬁes paternalistic behavior toward them. Tamar Schapiro, What Is a Child?,
109 ETHICS 715, 729-37 (1999).
See Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 841-46.
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such as race, gender, class, religion, ethics, cultural affiliations, and sexual orientation, as well as political and social beliefs.193 They also pervade children’s daily
lives, as debates about the right of transgender children to use the bathroom of
their chosen gender at school reveal.194
The Supreme Court and social scientists have recognized that children’s
identities are more ﬂuid than adults’ identities, changing rapidly over time.195
The Court’s recent decisions on juvenile sentencing rely in part on developmental literature showing that “[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less ﬁxed.”196 As the Court stated in Roper v. Simmons, “[t]he reality that
juveniles still struggle to deﬁne their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”197 But this ﬂuidity need not diminish children’s present
interests. Although children’s characters undoubtedly evolve, the fact that they
are transitory need not imply that they are not deserving of recognition or respect. Instead, space exists between formed and unformed characters, and children possess strong values and commitments in this liminal space.
Children have often asked courts to respect these present values and commitments, only to be rebuffed. For example, in Prince, nine-year old Betty Simmons sought to defend her right to distribute religious materials on the streets
of Brockton, Massachusetts as an ordained minister of the Jehovah’s Witness
faith. The Supreme Court recognized “[t]he rights of children to exercise their
religion.”198 Nevertheless, it held that Simmons had no right to express her religious identity in this manner because she had not “reached the age of full and
legal discretion.”199 The Court at no point considered whether Simmons’ religious beliefs were sincere or genuine despite her age. Although Prince is a relatively old case, courts continue to follow its lead. In 1972, the Court of Appeals
of New York affirmed a ﬁnding of neglect where a Jehovah’s Witness refused to

193.
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195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 188; Diane N. Ruble et al., The Development of a Sense of
“We”: The Emergence and Implications of Children’s Collective Identity, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SOCIAL SELF (M. Bennet & F. Sani eds., 2004).
See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated,
137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). Controversies over medical treatment for transgender children also
implicate debates over gender identity in young children. See supra note 190.
See Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 36162.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS (1968)).
Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
Id. at 170.
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consent to a blood transfusion for her 15-year-old son.200 The trial court did not
consider the child’s wishes in its opinion and explicitly declined to wait until the
child could legally decide for himself.201 In 2012, the Eastern District of California cited Prince when it dismissed children’s claims that a statute barring conversion therapy (or “sexual orientation change efforts”) violated their constitutional
rights.202
At other times, courts have respected children’s interests in expressing their
identities and political views, but only to the extent those interests supported
children’s future development. In Tinker, for example, the Supreme Court upheld children’s right to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam
War.203 A plurality of the Court justiﬁed its holding in part on the ground that
recognizing children’s free speech rights in school would help prepare them for
adult citizenship: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . .”204 The Court thus recognized children’s interests, but as citizens-in-waiting as opposed to full citizens in
the present.
Some courts, however, have questioned the value of self-expression even in
relation to children’s development. For example, courts have permitted censorship in schools even when children are expressing political views, such as when
Hispanic students in Texas were suspended for wearing “We Are Not Criminals”
t-shirts and walking out of class in protest.205 Courts are even more likely to permit censorship in schools when children are expressing identities that are not
overtly political in nature. The Ninth Circuit held that a school could prohibit a
student from wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts,206 for example, and some courts
have upheld prohibitions on long 207 or braided 208 hair. Courts have generally
dismissed children’s interests in such expressions as frivolous or otherwise unimportant. Many children, however, are most concerned about visible aspects of

200.

In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655-57 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (ﬁnding that the court cannot “shift
the responsibility for the ultimate decision onto [the child’s] shoulders”).
202. Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1371-73 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
203. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
204. Id. at 512.
205. Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
206. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
207. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972). But see, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
208. See, e.g., Fenceroy v. Morehouse Par. Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A. 05-0480, 2006 WL 39255 (W.D.
La. Jan. 6, 2006).
201.
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their identities, such as race, gender, and their emerging sexual identities, and
they use hair styles, clothing, and choice of music to explore and express those
aspects.209 Law should better recognize and support children’s expressions of all
aspects of their identities. These expressions give voice to who children are as
individuals at a particular time, enriching both their self-awareness and their acceptance of others who may differ.
4. Personal Integrity and Privacy
Children also have interests in maintaining their bodily and emotional integrity and in shielding certain aspects of their bodies and lives from others.210
These interests include safety from harm and freedom from unwanted intrusions. The authorities framework, through the current child welfare system,
strives to protect some of these interests, speciﬁcally children’s interests in being
protected from unreasonable abuse and neglect and other acts of family violence.211 The new law of the child supports those efforts but seeks both to focus
them and move beyond them in order to promote children’s broader interests in
exercising control over their bodies and minds more generally.
From very early ages, children’s evolving understandings of themselves are
informed by changing bodily traits and capacities, such as height, weight, race,
sex, disability, and physical prowess. As they undergo rapid physical changes,
children’s bodies play an important role in children’s evolving identities and experience of the world. Children’s bodies often represent milestones and otherwise mark time and development in ways that adult bodies do not.212 Because of
such differences, the new law of the child posits that children’s bodies are worthy
of protection above and beyond that provided to adult bodies.
The authorities framework often views children’s bodily differences through
the lens of disability, in keeping with its general view of children as lesser
adults.213 This view is grounded in physical reality to some extent, as most preadolescent children are physically smaller and weaker than most adults and their
209.

210.
211.
212.
213.

See, e.g., Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right To Be Queer, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
425, 502, 510 (2013) (concluding that “[t]he Constitution protects every child’s right to an
open future in sexual and gender development—an equal liberty to be straight or queer”).
See B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295 (2015).
See, e.g., JOHN E.B. MYERS, A HISTORY OF CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA (2004).
Adult bodies also change over time, albeit—with the exception of pregnancy—at a slower rate.
The invocation of disability—in contrast to a mythical concept of “normality”—has also been
used to justify racial and gender inequality, as well as the systemic marginalization of children
and adults with disabilities. Douglas C. Baynton, Disability and the Justiﬁcation of Inequality in
American History, in THE NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 36 (Paul K.
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brains do not fully mature until around the age of twenty-ﬁve.214 Yet children’s
bodies are not necessarily less capable than the bodies of adults. Children heal
more quickly; they outperform adults in many athletic activities; their capacity
for physical play is almost unmatched in adult life; and their bodies have the
capacity to change dramatically through growth spurts, neuroplasticity, and hormonal surges. 215 Children’s vulnerabilities therefore exist alongside unique
physical and mental capacities. Viewing children as lesser adults narrowly construes children’s interests in their bodies as largely limited to protection from
harm.
The focus on preventing child maltreatment overshadows the many ways
children’s interests in personal integrity and privacy might be better promoted
and protected. Indeed, by prioritizing parental rights and narrowly deﬁning
maltreatment, the authorities framework permits parental behavior that would
otherwise violate the bodily integrity of adults. Children come into the world
completely dependent on their caregivers, meaning that caregivers must have full
and unfettered access to and control over children’s bodies from birth. Some
bodily “intrusions” are therefore initially acceptable and even necessary, such as
holding, soothing, caressing, feeding, and bathing infants and young children.
But the intrusiveness of bodily ministrations becomes more troublesome as a
child grows older. Activities that are acceptable for an infant, such as bathings,
feedings, or physical restraints, would raise serious concerns for a ten- or ﬁfteenyear old. Although the authorities framework does take account of children’s
changing interests in bodily integrity and privacy, its deference to parental rights
may leave children unprotected against harmful parental intrusions.
The new law of the child therefore recognizes a broader range of interests in
personal integrity and privacy within the home. Aside from physical or sexual
abuse, the authorities framework does not recognize such interests unless and
until parental intrusions become a matter of public concern (for example, if parents start posting nude photographs of children online). Parents may consent to
Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001). Challenging and dismantling these constructions is
a project that spans more than one ﬁeld of study.
214. See State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 815-16 (Iowa 2016).
215. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY (Richard M. Lerner ed., 6th ed. 2006)
(detailing the various stages of children’s psychological development); PETER R. HUTTENLOCHER, NEURAL PLASTICITY: THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (2002) (describing neural plasticity—the brain’s ability to change in
response to normal developmental processes, experience, and injury—in children and adults);
CYNTHIA LIGHTFOOT & SHEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN (7th ed. 2012) (examining child development as a process involving the whole child within multiple, mutually
inﬂuencing contexts); LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE (9th ed. 2010) (discussing biological, cognitive, and relationship changes during adolescence).
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governmental searches of their children’s bedrooms, and they may certainly
search those bedrooms themselves.216 Parental dissemination of private information about children’s bodies—or children’s lives more generally—also largely
goes unchallenged.217 In fact, it has become common practice for parents to detail children’s lives on social media and in the mainstream press, often to further
parents’ own interests instead of those of their children.218
The new law of the child seeks to provide a framework for better balancing
children’s distinct interests in personal integrity and privacy against these parental interests. Potential conﬂicts are most likely to arise around issues relating to
sexuality, reproductive healthcare, and abortion. For example, as discussed
above, older children have interests in experimenting with sex, both to experience physical pleasure and to expand their understanding of connection and intimacy. Although statutory rape laws and sexting prohibitions make sense for
young children, laws that prohibit teenagers from engaging in consensual sexual
interactions with each other may interfere with their interests in learning about
the sexual dimensions of their lives.219
Children also have interests in controlling the ﬂow of information to their
parents, especially when their actions and decisions may conﬂict with their parents’ wishes. For example, children’s chosen gender identities or sexual orientations might be known at school but not at home, and children have an interest
in keeping it this way. Children may also seek to access certain types of healthcare
on their own. Most states allow children to access mental health or drug counseling services without notifying their parents. In contrast, the state is free to

216.

See Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 70 (2011) (“[A] child obviously has no protection against the intrusion of his parents into his bedroom because the provision is meant
only to protect the privacy of the individual against state actors.”).
217. See Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children’s Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 66 EMORY L.J.
839, 847-54 (2017). Some parents’ publicity has been extreme enough to attract widespread
attention. Sally Mann, whose photography collection Immediate Family features portraits of
her children nude and injured, is one example. Sally Mann, Sally Mann’s Exposure, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/the-cost-of-sally
-manns-exposure.html [http://perma.cc/G7DK-WRYB]; Richard B. Woodward, The Disturbing Photography of Sally Mann, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 27, 1992), http://www.nytimes
.com/1992/09/27/magazine/the-disturbing-photography-of-sally-mann.html [http://
perma.cc/DAN7-3U3X].
218. See Steinberg, supra note 217, at 847-54.
219. See, e.g., JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951 (2011); Lawrence G. Walters, How To Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98
(2010).
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impose parental notiﬁcation or consent requirements on children seeking to terminate a pregnancy, so long as it provides a process for judicial bypass.220 Thus,
in states with notiﬁcation or consent statutes, a child will be forced to disclose
her pregnancy to either her parents or a judge.
Our approach questions how these practices affect children’s broader interests in personal integrity and privacy, thereby attempting to bring those interests
to center stage. Children currently enjoy almost no privacy rights vis-à-vis their
parents, and instead must rely on parental decisions to respect their privacy interests.221 More fully recognizing children’s interests in personal integrity and
privacy does not mean that all parental or state intrusions should be prohibited,
but it will mandate different ways of balancing children’s present and future interests against parental prerogatives, as set forth in Part III.
5. Participation in Civic Life
Finally, children have interests in interacting with society beyond the conﬁnes of family or school. Children’s nonparental relationships further some of
these interests, but children also have interests in participating in larger societal
structures, including in the economy and in politics. The authorities framework
almost entirely overlooks these interests when it assumes that children are
largely conﬁned to home, school, or rehabilitative settings until they become
adults.222 The traditional infancy defense is illustrative: pursuant to this defense,
children are permitted to void contracts into which they otherwise validly entered before reaching the age of majority,223 thus limiting a child’s engagement
in the world of commerce.

220.

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Emily Gold Waldman, Show and Tell?: Students’ Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 699, 728-30 (2015) (summarizing case law establishing that children do not have privacy rights in relation to their parents).
222. See supra text accompanying note 97.
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12(2)(b), 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This doctrine has shifted to some extent as the authorities framework has come to recognize older
children’s autonomy in certain contexts. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1304 (2000) (“A clear, straightforward rule
recognizing adolescent decisional ability to contract would be commensurate with the diligence, efficiency, and economic hallmarks of contract law and, perhaps more potently, cultivate its mainstream moral component—that promises ought to be kept.”). For example, the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment recently adopted a minority rule that
requires contracting children to make restitution “as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 16(1), 33(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2011). This emerging view better recognizes and facilitates children’s participation in
221.
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Yet almost all children attending school are exposed to aspects of civil society
and politics and may seek to participate in them. Children’s opportunities to engage in civic life are of utmost importance and often differ vastly for children
based on their race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and
many other dimensions of children’s lives. At least one recent case successfully
grappled with this reality. In Dancy v. McGinley, the Second Circuit affirmed an
award of emotional damages to Elting, a seventeen-year-old African American
boy who was beaten by a police officer in the course of an arrest for a crime he
did not commit.224 Reﬂecting many of the concerns raised by the Black Lives
Matter movement, the Second Circuit held that the award of $115,000 in emotional damages was not excessive. The court noted that Elting’s age was “of particular signiﬁcance,” since the event would have “a deeper and [more] lasting
impact on a seventeen-year old than an adult.”225 More speciﬁcally, the court emphasized that the event had led Elting to lose “trust in the police,” quoting Justice
Sotomayor’s description of “the talk” that “black and brown parents” must give
their children to keep them safe from police violence.226
Children’s broader interests as political actors, workers, consumers, and,
more generally, agents in the world are varied and diverse across multiple dimensions.227 For example, many children desire to engage in paid work, whether
to enable consumption or to support their families. And almost all children seek
to purchase goods or to inﬂuence the purchases of others. Nurturing and legitimizing these interests can lead to radical policy shifts.
Despite children’s interests in participating in civic life, existing law excludes
children from the quintessential means of doing so: they are denied the right to
vote before they reach the age of eighteen.228 Some believe that children’s political interests are represented by their parents,229 but parents neither receive more

224.
225.
226.
227.

228.

229.

the market. Such reform is not motivated by children’s present interests, however. Instead, it
seeks to protect adult parties from the harsh consequences of the traditional infancy doctrine.
Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 115.
Id. (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
See, e.g., Aoife Daly, Demonstrating Positive Obligations: Children’s Rights and Peaceful Protest in
International Law, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 763, 770 (2013) (“Children consistently express that they wish to have greater participation in political matters.”).
See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right To Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039,
1062-63 (2017). For an argument that children’s criminal responsibility should be linked to
their ability to vote, see GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming 2018).
See, e.g., Barnett v. Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Children cannot vote, but
their parents can.”); Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Children are citi-
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votes than other adults, nor are they permitted to vote by proxy on behalf of their
children.230 The conception of childhood citizenship is greatly constrained. To
the extent that citizenship is intimately tied to the franchise, children may appropriately be viewed as citizens in waiting—or minor citizens—until the age of
eighteen.
Recognizing children’s present interests does not mean that children must be
given full voting rights. Indeed, many children have no conception of voting and
some would become the puppets of their parents or other adults in their lives.
But our approach does make some proposals to extend voting rights to children
less unrealistic. Andrew Rehfeld argues in favor of “fractional votes” for children
beginning at age twelve. Like learners’ permits for the franchise, such “[f]ractional shares would allow adolescents to internalize civic engagement at a time
that their habits are forming and developing.”231 More than a dozen nations have
lowered the voting age to sixteen for purposes of at least some elections, although no jurisdiction has permitted children under sixteen to vote.232 Because
the new law of the child acknowledges children’s interests in civic participation,
especially as they age, it opens the door to some, perhaps modiﬁed, voting rights
for children.
***
The foregoing discussion of children’s ﬁve broader interests is meant to be
neither deﬁnitive nor exhaustive. We invite further examination of children’s interests in the here and now that more fully explicates children’s experiences at
multiple stages in their lives. Our assessment indicates, however, that children’s
broader interests will not be furthered by mere reﬁnements to the authorities
framework. A total restructuring of the ﬁeld of children and law is required. In
zens; their interests are entitled to be considered by politicians, and this is more likely to happen if total rather than voting-age population is used in determining compliance with the
equal protection clause, as it is in taking the census. For then the voting power of parents of
minor children is ampliﬁed, giving such children a modest measure of representation in the
political process.” (citations omitted)); Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes
on Account of Their Children? Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505 (2000) (“It is widely assumed that voters who are parents cast the
single votes they now receive in part at least in pursuit of the interests of their children.”).
230. For one proposal to institute such proxy voting, see Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote:
Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463 (1998). For what such proxy voting may mean for
American democracy, see Bennett, supra note 229, at 536-40.
231. Andrew Rehfeld, The Child as Democratic Citizen, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141,
158-59 (2011); see also ARCHARD, supra note 114, at 70-74 (arguing that children should not be
denied the right to vote); Paul E. Peterson, An Immodest Proposal, 121 DAEDALUS 151 (1992)
(comparing the extent of social welfare programs and expenditures for children and the elderly, while noting that only the latter have the right to vote).
232. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral
Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1447, 1473-74 (2012).
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the next Part, we elaborate a new tripartite framework that we believe offers the
best opportunity for advancing children’s broader interests.
iii. relationships, responsibilities, rights: a new tripartite
framework
The articulation of children’s broader interests enables us to reimagine the
ﬁeld of children and law, recentering it around a tripartite framework of relationships, responsibilities, and rights. This restructuring rejects the authorities
framework’s preoccupation with assigning control over children to parents or the
state. We aim to free the ﬁeld from its current reliance on hierarchical relationships of control and the developmental concerns that drive them. Instead, our
more coherent, integrated, and conceptually grounded structure is informed by
the relationships that support children’s broader interests, adult responsibilities
to further those interests, and affirmative rights that best protect them.
By shifting the focal point from adult authority to children’s interests, a more
normatively compelling way to organize the ﬁeld emerges, one that brings conceptual ordering to the legal rules that can and should further children’s interests. We open with children’s relationships because children’s custodial status is
the ﬁrst and primary deﬁning feature of children’s relationship to the law. Yet we
go beyond custodial relationships of authority to address the full range of children’s relationships that should be recognized and protected by law. Next, we
highlight the responsibilities that adults do and should have to children—not
simply as a by-product of adult authority, but independent of and prior to claims
of authority. And ﬁnally, we articulate the range of rights furthering children’s
interests, that is, not just rights of authority (parental rights; children’s agency
rights) but most importantly children’s affirmative rights to goods and services.
This tripartite scheme, we believe, most clearly structures the law to advance
the broader interests of children we identiﬁed in Part II. Our framework, however, is not the only way to organize the ﬁeld of children and the law. This initial
elaboration will beneﬁt from debate and development by courts, legislators,
agencies, and commentators moving forward.233 For now, we emphasize that the
new framework liberates the ﬁeld from its traditional focus on allocating authority by location: home, school, and the juvenile justice system. Location still matters in our framework, but only as it informs legal rules relating to relationships,
responsibilities, and rights. This new approach therefore moves toward the integration and consistency of legal rules across both place and time. The three

233.

Further reﬁnement might especially address the differing stages of children’s lives. For example, one might imagine sub-categories of doctrine based on infancy, early childhood, and adolescence.
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organizing categories of relationships, responsibilities, and rights are neither
ﬁxed nor independent. Most legal issues affecting children implicate all three
areas.
A rereading of the iconic case of Parham v. J.R.234 highlights how our new
framework differs from the authorities framework. In this case, children who
had been committed to state-run psychiatric hospitals argued that the laws allowing parents to consent to their commitment violated their procedural due
process rights. In place of parental consent, the children sought formal, adversarial hearings to determine whether they met the criteria for commitment. The
Supreme Court assumed that the children had important interests at stake, including freedom from bodily restraint and avoidance of the stigma that might
follow from commitment. The Court ultimately concluded, however, that an informal review by a “neutral factﬁnder” at the admitting institution was all that
the Constitution required. 235 In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked
“Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children,”236 emphasizing that the law “historically . . . has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.”237 The Court also noted that “[t]he statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” 238 The
Court’s analysis therefore embodied the authorities framework’s primary concern with assigning control over children to parents or the state. Accordingly, the
Court’s limited consideration of children’s interests simply gave way to parental
rights.
Our tripartite framework, in contrast, emphasizes many factors left unaddressed by the Parham Court: the responsibility of parents to make every effort to provide for noninstitutional care; the effect that commitment might have
on a child’s sense of being loved and wanted; children’s interests in relationships
with people other than their parents, including siblings and peers; the duty of
mental health professionals to keep children out of institutional care unless necessary; and children’s interest in engaging with others in the world. When
viewed in this way, Parham becomes less about authority over children and more
about children’s relationships (with parents, doctors, siblings, and peers) intersecting with adult responsibilities to provide services to children, and the affirmative rights children may have to claim those services. A court applying our

234.

442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 606-07.
236. Id. at 602.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 603.
235.
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framework would therefore likely conclude that children’s broader interests justify both some kind of formal hearing as well as the provision of outpatient mental health services before commitment.
A. Relationships
A broad range of relationships beyond parent-child relationships are deserving of the law’s support because they are often essential to children’s well-being,
both in the present and over time. Support of such relationships will necessarily
affect the current doctrine of parental rights, and we thus begin by analyzing
how our framework would support children’s relationships with their parents
and then move to children’s relationships more broadly. This Section draws
heavily on children’s broader interests in relationships as set out in Part II above,
but also from the full array of children’s interests to the extent nonparental relationships often further children’s exposure to new ideas, development of identity, protection from harm, and participation in civic life.
1. With Parents
The parent-child relationship is most children’s ﬁrst and primary relationship, often serving as a model for future relationships in their lives. Because of
children’s need for attachment and care, this early relationship is vital to children’s present well-being as well as to their future development.239 Our framework therefore seeks to foster healthy and ongoing relationships between children and their parents. To this extent, we embrace the authorities framework’s
assumption that children’s interests are best served when their parental relationships are not disrupted by the state.240
At the same time, our framework also encompasses a more expansive conception of the parent-child relationship that goes beyond parental control of
children’s upbringing. Aspects of family law doctrine have suggested that parentchild interactions encompass more than parental authority,241 but legal scholars

239.

See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 121, at 22 (offering a “psychological parent” theory).
240. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13 (arguing that parental authority has strong constitutional protections).
241. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting that Amish children might be able to veto their parents’ educational decisions).
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for the most part have not explored alternative conceptions of this relationship.242 Even scholars who promote children’s rights tend to focus on ways to
reduce parental control rather than exploring conceptualizations of the parentchild relationship that go beyond control.243 Our framework, in contrast, values
parent-child relationships for how they enrich children’s present lives as well as
meet their developmental needs for care and guidance.
Our focus on the diverse ways parents enrich children’s lives has several implications for the legal regulation of the parent-child relationship. In some instances, promoting children’s broader interests in the parent-child relationship
will better insulate parent-child relationships from disruption by the state. Existing laws in many states, for example, subsume parental failure to protect children from third-party harm into deﬁnitions of parental abuse or neglect.244 Such
conﬂation overly intrudes on the parent-child relationship by unduly extending
the consequences of an abuse or neglect ﬁnding, including removal from the
home on a ﬁnding of failure to protect.245 We recognize concerns surrounding
parental failure to protect children from third-party harm, but we distinguish
that harm from direct parental harm. Most importantly, because the parent-child
relationship is important to children’s interests in the here and now, failure to
protect a child from third-party harm should never be the sole basis for removing
a child from the custody of a parent who is not directly harming the child. State
intervention in this context should be geared toward alleviating the harm caused
by the third party while preserving the parent-child relationship.246
242.

243.
244.
245.

246.

In contrast to the parent-child context, in the marriage context legal scholars have engaged in
spirited theoretical discussions about the nature of marriage, playing a role in changing traditional conceptions of marriage within both scholarly discourse and how family law is practiced
on the ground. See Rosenbury, supra note 109.
For one example, see Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood, supra note 15.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(9)-(10) (West 2009).
Existing law authorizes such removal in an effort to punish parents or to send a message that
parents (often mothers) must take greater care in supervising their children. See Justine A.
Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for
Failure To Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004); Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN.
L. REV. 367, 402-10 (2017) (discussing the “rule of motherhood” that “mothers must always
protect”); Rebecca Ann Schernitzki, What Kind of Mother Are You? The Relationship Between
Motherhood, Battered Woman Syndrome and Missouri Law, 56 J. MO. B. 50, 52 (2000) (“By strategically placing women into the categories of ‘good mother’ and ‘bad mother,’ society can
easily advocate the position that bad mothers deserve to be punished when they ‘allow their
children to be abused’ at the hands of another.”).
Such intervention might include separating the child from the third party, providing counseling for both the parent and the child, or even some limited supervision of the home. If a parent
fails to prevent or end the harm caused by the third party after this intervention, additional
state intervention may be warranted under statutes and doctrine governing direct parental
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At other times, situating the parent-child relationship within a larger web of
children’s relationships and interests will limit existing parental rights. Our
framework weighs children’s interests in having parents exercise exclusive control over their upbringing against children’s interests in maintaining close ties to
other children and adults, in being exposed to new ideas, in expressing their
identity, in protecting their personal integrity and privacy, and in participating
in civic life. This balancing of children’s broader interests may limit some of the
prerogatives that parents currently enjoy under the authorities framework.
For example, under the existing doctrine of parental rights, parents may control their children’s social relationships, including by denying the visitation
needed to maintain existing relationships. Our framework suggests that this prerogative should not be so absolute. Parents and other caregivers should have the
right to exclude other adults from access to their children in their earliest months
and years because children ﬂourish when early attachment relationships are stable, secure, and long-term.247 Yet as children grow, so too does their interest in
life beyond the family. Children have independent interests—not derivative of
third-party interests or rights—in developing and maintaining relationships
with nonparental ﬁgures, such as other relatives, foster parents, stepparents, siblings, and other children.248 Children’s interests in maintaining such relationships may thus justify access to these third parties over the objection of custodial
parents in proceedings brought by either adults or the state, such as divorce,
immigration, visitation, or delinquency hearings.249
In these ways and more, our tripartite framework posits a more expansive
conception of the parent-child relationship that goes beyond parental control of
children’s upbringing. By situating children’s interests in maintaining the parent-child relationship within a larger web of relationships and interests, we value

neglect. Until such direct maltreatment is established, however, children’s interests in maintaining their relationships with parents should be paramount.
247. See 1-3 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1997-98); GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra
121.
248. AM. LAW INST., supra note 138, at 203.
249. See Buss, supra note 13. In such cases, judges should weigh the impact of recognizing these
third-party relationships on the child’s relationship with her parents. Such consideration may
very well dictate different outcomes in cases like Troxel and Michael H. In Troxel, 530 U.S. 57
(2000), a court utilizing our framework might very well have found that the children’s best
interests lay with seeing the grandparents more often than the mother wanted, thus overriding her parental rights. Certainly, in Michael H., 492 U.S. 937 (1989), where the biological
father was denied any right to see his daughter, a court under our framework would carefully
weigh the child’s interest in maintaining a relationship she had already developed with her
biological father along with her interest in her relationship with her mother.
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parent-child relationships not in service to parental autonomy or control but because of the multiple ways these relationships further children’s broader interests.
2. With Children and Other Adults
A focus on children’s broader interests also opens the door to describing and
reforming law’s regulation of children’s relationships with a range of other actors
in children’s lives. Our framework seeks to acknowledge and further children’s
interests in a range of relationships with siblings; peers; grandparents and other
kin; former foster care parents; biological parents post-adoption; teachers,
counselors, mentors, and coaches; and even certain professionals, including doctors, therapists, social workers, and lawyers.
To begin, recognizing and promoting children’s relationships with other
children is a core concern of our new framework. Part II describes how the authorities framework generally overlooks sibling relationships, although there are
promising developments in this area. State legislatures and the federal government have begun efforts to preserve the sibling relationship when children are
removed from the home.250 While these developments should be applauded, our
approach calls for an even more full-bodied recognition of the positive dimension of sibling relationships in the context of custody, foster care, removal, adoption, and immigration proceedings.
Our new framework also recognizes the importance of children’s relationships with children who are not their siblings. Positive peer relationships are vital aspects of children’s lives in the here and now.251 They enrich and diversify
children’s experiences of forming and navigating relationships, help expose children to new ideas, and further children’s exploration of their identities.252 Past
attempts to recognize these peer relationships have focused on children’s autonomous desires to the exclusion of their other interests. For example, some scholars have suggested that at least older children should be extended the right to
intimate association currently enjoyed by adults. 253 Scholars thus have urged
that children should be permitted to maintain peer relationships even in the face
250.

See supra note 157.
See supra discussion in Part II.
252. See supra discussion in Part II.
253. Not all horizontal relationships between adults are affirmatively recognized by the state, but
all are protected against undue state interference through the right to intimate association.
This protection extends to non-sexual associations, including friendship. See Karst, supra note
127, at 629-37 & n.26; Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Beneﬁts?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 20203 (2007).
251.
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of parental disapproval.254 Such rights-based proposals recognize children’s interest in relationships with other children only when they are old enough to be
sufficiently like adults, reinforcing most children’s dependency to the exclusion
of their present interests. Moreover, children’s peer relationships generally require some assistance from parents, even if solely in the form of providing background conditions such as transportation and permission to leave the home.255
Proposals to extend older children relationship rights ignore this critical difference when they ask the state to protect children’s relationship choices against the
wishes of their parents.256 A relationship between two children that is against
the will of the parents and is “left alone” by the state will often be impossible for
the children to maintain.
Our framework therefore calls for new ways of recognizing and protecting
children’s peer relationships in some contexts. With respect to custody proceedings, for example, states could develop guidelines for considering children’s peer
relationships when a parent with primary custody of a child attempts to relocate
against the wishes of the noncustodial parent.257 Currently, judges in these cases
typically evaluate children’s best interests by considering what amounts to two
factors: the potential beneﬁts of the move for the custodial family and the child’s
ability to maintain ties with the nonrelocating parent.258 Although children in

254.
255.
256.

257.

258.
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As such, children would be able to appeal to a judge if their parents failed to respect those
rights. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 114, at 16-17; Meyer, supra note 156, at 1127-29.
Adult relationships, in contrast, generally require no assistance from third parties other than
limited enablement from the state in the form of being left alone.
See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 114, at 94 (putting forward one version of children’s relationship
rights, modeled after those of incompetent adults, in which “the child would have a presumptive right to choose with which third parties he or she would associate, a right that a guardian
could overcome only by showing that the child’s choice would likely result in harm”).
As in the abuse and neglect context, a consideration of children’s horizontal relationships
would rarely be dispositive of the issue at hand. Judges would still evaluate multiple factors
beyond children’s peer relationships to reach their relocation decisions, much like judges in
abuse and neglect cases primarily focus on children’s general safety and welfare when determining whether the state should remove a child from the home or terminate parental rights.
But by addressing the ways such determinations affect children’s peer relationships, judges
would also recognize the ways children interact outside of parent-child relationships even as
those vertical relationships govern large aspects of children’s lives.
For a summary of these approaches, see generally Ciesluk v. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 2005).
This focus is generally true of the scholarly literature on relocation as well. Compare Judith S.
Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not To Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in
the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996) (arguing for a presumption in favor of relocation), with Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development
Research To Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297 (2000) (reviewing research on the attachment processes, separation
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these situations will also be moving away from other important individuals in
their lives—including other children—judges generally do not take those potential losses into account when making relocation decisions.259 Older children are
often not even asked for their views about the move.260 Under the new framework, judges might take into account children’s interests in maintaining such
peer relationships as one factor in their relocation analysis. Such interests will
rarely be dispositive, but they should be considered and protected when possible.
Our focus on a broader range of children’s relationships with other children
is a clear departure from the authorities framework, but this focus does not necessitate signiﬁcantly expanded state intervention in family life. There are multiple routes short of direct intervention that states might take to better facilitate
children’s interactions with other children. For example, states could adopt educational curricula that emphasize the beneﬁts of peer learning. States could also
require public schools to open their doors for after-school youth activities, including those run largely by other children. Schools could begin peer mediation
programs. Local governments could also create more playgrounds and other recreational spaces for children and ensure their security and safety.
The new law of the child also supports more fundamental shifts with respect
to children’s relationships with adults other than their parents. Children’s relationships with paid caregivers might be recognized in certain contexts, for example. The authorities framework treats such relationships as mere employment
relationships, ignoring the close bonds that children may form with their caregivers.261 Our framework instead seeks to foster those bonds, although not necessarily by bestowing legally enforceable rights on paid caregivers. Instead,
from attachment ﬁgures, and the roles of mothers and fathers in promoting psychosocial adjustment in children) and Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in
Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83 (2000) (supporting a policy of encouraging both parents to remain in close proximity to their children, in opposition to Wallerstein).
For an important exception, see Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747 (2007), which details the relevance
of the noncustodial parent’s mobility.
259. Other scholars have emphasized that these approaches to relocation do not adequately address
children’s interests. See generally Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the
“Right” Thing To Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 902-04 (2007); Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and
the Indissolubility of Parenthood, 40 FAM. L.Q. 237, 262 (2006); Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation:
Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983, 1023-25 (2000); Weiner,
supra note 258, at 1749-60. But these scholars have not acknowledged the potential harm to
children’s relationships with other children.
260. See Elrod, supra note 259, at 902-04.
261. See Murray, supra note 90, at 387-94; Tali Schaefer, Disposable Mothers: Paid In-Home Caretaking and the Regulation of Parenthood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305, 322 (2008) (“[P]aid caretakers are excluded from challenging parental authority and control over their children and
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courts might take into account children’s interests in continued access to former
caregivers when making custody and visitation decisions.
Our approach also better promotes children’s interests in their relationships
with foster parents. Under current law, foster parents—even where there are kinship ties or placement has been since infancy—have few rights.262 The Supreme
Court has indicated that any interest a foster parent might have is inferior to the
interests of biological parents. 263 Yet these relationships are quite important
from the perspective of the child.264 When a child is placed in foster care at birth,
or has resided with foster care parents for an extended period of time, the attachment to a foster parent from the child’s point of view may be indistinguishable
from the attachment to any other parental ﬁgure.265 In such circumstances, efforts can and should be made to maintain a child’s primary attachment, while at
the same time recognizing the child’s interest in maintaining ties to his or her
biological parents. Foster parents are not a homogenous group; each case will
present different issues depending on the type of proceeding, the kinship relationship, the duration of the foster care, and other factors. Our framework’s
child-centric approach does not guarantee that a child will always have access to
a former foster parent, but rather that children’s broader interests in these relationships will be taken into account when a court is determining custody or visitation issues.
The tripartite framework thereby situates children within a web of diverse
relationships, each with the potential to further their well-being. These relationships go well beyond the parent-child relationship but by no means displace it.
Unlike the authorities framework, the new law of the child aims to balance children’s interests in maintaining close parental ties within a web of broader relationships.

262.

263.
264.

265.
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therefore pose no threat.”). For one exception, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving,
and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed To Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L.
REV. 25, 31 (2009), which argues that paid childcare providers should not be automatically
excluded from petitioning for de facto legal status.
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (assuming
but not holding that foster parents have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a
relationship with their foster children).
Id.
See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children To Maintain
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 384 (1994) (“[C]ourts have neglected to examine the possibility and reality of a loving and caring relationship between a
child and a legally unrelated adult and to preserve that relationship by employing a childcentered approach.”).
Id. at 383.
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B. Responsibilities
Our framework next focuses on adult responsibilities for children, including
the responsibilities of the state, parents, and other adults in children’s lives. Under the authorities framework, the issue of adult responsibilities for children is
left largely unexamined.266 The state confers a range of beneﬁts on children, but
these are generally considered a matter of discretion rather than duty. To the extent the authorities framework addresses parental responsibilities, these duties
are usually understood to be derivative of parental rights of control.267 Indeed,
parental rights often operate so as to prevent the articulation of adult duties to
children. Parents are not tasked with speciﬁc responsibilities to their children—
beyond providing basic necessities—in large part because spelling out parental
duties is at odds with the freedom from governmental control that deﬁnes parental rights in the ﬁrst place.268
The new tripartite framework, in contrast, addresses the multiple ways adult
responsibilities for children can and should foster a collaborative relationship
between parents and the state.269 The authorities framework rests on the premise that parents have the fundamental due process right to direct their children’s
upbringing free from governmental control. 270 This underlying entitlement
casts the relationship between parents and the state as predominately one of conﬂict.271 Parents and the state become locked in battle for control over children,
obscuring the possibility that parents and the state are and should be engaged in
a joint enterprise of caregiving for children.

266.

Dailey, supra note 13, at 2169 (“The Supreme Court has recognized some affirmative constitutional rights . . . but for the most part the Constitution is treated as a charter of negative
liberties.”).
267. The Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he linkage between parental duty and parental right,”
quite clearly stating that “the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they
have assumed.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983). Parents carry the affirmative obligation to raise their children and are protected while doing so by the doctrine of parental
rights. If parents lose their rights, they generally are relieved of the duty to support their children. For instance, the parent of an emancipated minor loses any duty to support the child at
the same time that they lose their parental rights. Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009); see also Maria Roumiantseva, Note, Because Parents Owe It to Them: Unaccompanied LGBTQ Youth Enforcing the Parental Duty of Support, 16 CUNY L. REV. 363, 373-75
(2013).
268. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 100 (2014).
269. Cf. id. at 152.
270. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
271. See infra Section III.B.1.
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Our emphasis on adult responsibilities shares some characteristics with
scholarly approaches that analogize parents to trustees or otherwise reconceptualize the parent-child relationship as a ﬁduciary relationship.272 Like our framework, a theory of parents as trustees or ﬁduciaries elevates children’s interests
over parental rights and focuses on parental duties. Yet trustee and ﬁduciary
models have their limitations. Although the concept of trusteeship may be deployed to establish a legal obligation to put children’s ﬁnancial interests ﬁrst, it
does not address the totality of children’s experiences. Similarly, a ﬁduciary
model emphasizes parental responsibilities but does not specify the content of
those responsibilities. More fundamentally, theories of trusteeship and ﬁduciary
relationships function on a much smaller scale. While these theories remain narrowly focused on the parent-child relationship, our approach calls for a new way
of thinking about adult responsibilities as part of a broader framework encompassing the relationships, responsibilities, and rights of children and the adults
in their lives.
Other scholars focus on parental and state duties to care for children.273 Yet
these scholars argue for the importance of recognizing and developing law’s
treatment of children—particularly young children—as vulnerable individuals in
need of support, care, and protection.274 Although framed in terms of children’s
welfare or adult duties to children, the attention to hierarchical relationships of
control continues unabated, as does the question of which adults—parents or
state—carry responsibilities for children. These scholars do focus a certain
amount of attention on children’s needs rather than adult authority, but the prevailing emphasis on children’s dependency is essentially unchallenged, pitting
parents against the state in addressing children’s needs.
Drawing on children’s broader interests, our framework instead focuses on
the shared responsibilities of parents and the state to (1) nurture healthy and safe
relationships with parents and others; (2) educate children; (3) rehabilitate children who engage in misconduct; and (4) foster children’s participation in the
wider world. Of course, these areas of responsibility will often overlap. For example, caregiving also encompasses responses to children’s misconduct, juvenile
justice frequently intersects with education, and children’s market participation

272.

See, e.g., Connie K. Beck et. al., The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
669, (1978); Scott & Scott, supra note 13.
273. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 13.
274. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13.
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implicates protection of their welfare. Taken together, these four spheres of responsibility highlight the many ways our framework seeks to promote shared
parental-state duties toward children.275
1. Caregiving and Protection
Like the authorities framework, our framework assigns responsibility for
children’s caregiving and protection to parents because the parental relationship,
whether actual or inchoate, is vital to children’s present well-being and development.276 Our approach emphasizes, however, that other adults, such as unmarried partners of legal parents, guardians, and stepparents, may also willingly take
on responsibilities for children by developing actual caregiving relationships
with them, either alongside parents or to ﬁll gaps in the parent-child relationship. We also maintain the prevailing legal presumption that parents and these
other custodial caregivers—rather than other adults or the state277—are strongly
motivated to carry out primary caretaking duties and should provide physical,
emotional, ﬁnancial, and other support for children.
Additionally, our framework highlights that parents and custodial caregivers
have a responsibility to allow and encourage children to develop relationships
with peers and other adults, as identiﬁed in the previous Section. Although custodial relationships are crucial to children’s well-being and future development,
custodians are unable to provide certain emotional, intellectual, and social beneﬁts that children derive from relationships with adults and peers outside the
family. The new framework therefore encourages parents and other custodians

275.

Most of these duties would fall to state and local governments. Federalism serves to protect
against the risks of totalitarian authority that arise when a single government assumes exclusive control over children’s upbringing. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(rejecting the “power of the state to standardize its children”); see also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1858 (1995) (defending state sovereignty over children’s rights). The federal government also has duties that speciﬁcally arise under the federal
Constitution or statutes. Immigration, for example, is an area almost exclusively governed by
federal law, although some immigration statutes look to state law. See Special Immigrant Juvenile, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2016). But in almost all cases, the responsibilities for children’s caregiving, education, protection, and rehabilitation will be shared by federal and state governments. When we refer to “the state,” therefore, we mean to invoke all levels of governmental
authority.
276. Cf. Buss, supra note 13, at 651 (arguing that “parental identity derives not from any set of
individual characteristics, but rather from the parent-child relationship itself and, more particularly, the centrality of the relationship in the child’s life”).
277. See id. at 647 (noting that “the state’s knowledge of and commitment to any particular child
is relatively thin”).
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to loosen the reins of their authority as children grow, allowing children to expand their relationships in the broader world.
For example, parents have duties to protect children from harm. Our approach would raise questions about religious exemption laws that allow parents
to deny medical care to children on the ground that it violates parents’ religious
beliefs.278 Indeed, under the new tripartite framework, states might impose a
duty on parents to certify that their children are seen by a medical professional
at least once a year. Our approach would also interrogate more closely parental
bodily intrusions, such as circumcision,279 cosmetic surgery and hormone therapy,280 and so-called normalization surgery for intersex infants,281 each of which
affect children’s broader interests in personal integrity and the ways they experience their bodies.
The state also shares responsibility for ensuring that children are protected
from harm in ways that do not unduly disrupt children’s relationships with their
primary caregivers and others.282 Although state involvement in a child’s custodial care is usually triggered by a breakdown in custodial care, and is perhaps
rarely welcomed, our framework emphasizes that state intervention need not always be adversarial. State intervention can be—and often is—supportive of custodial relationships.283 When primary caregivers struggle, state services should

278.

For an overview of religious exemption laws, see Aleksandra Sandstrom, Most States Allow
Religious Exemptions from Child Abuse and Neglect Laws, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 12, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/12/most-states-allow-religious
-exemptions-from-child-abuse-and-neglect-laws [http://perma.cc/464C-Q5DX].
279. See Peter W. Adler, Is Circumcision Legal?, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 439, 451-65 (2013); William
E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337,
340-43 (1984).
280. See Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 959-65
(2010).
281. See M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 Fed. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 2015) (dismissing an intersex plaintiff ’s complaint after normalization surgery because the child’s rights were not
clearly established); Robert Hupf, Allyship to the Intersex Community on Cosmetic, Non-Consensual Genital “Normalizing” Surgery, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2015).
282. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) (“[W]hile there is still reason to believe
that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the parens patriae interest favors
preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.”).
283. Under existing child welfare laws, the state is required to make reasonable efforts to keep
families together and bring about a rapid reuniﬁcation where possible. Federal law also requires the state to take steps toward terminating parental rights after children have been in
foster care for ﬁfteen of the prior twenty-two months. After twenty-two months, a child’s
attachment might well develop with a new caretaker. See, e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (requiring that the state make
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be provided to help parents improve their caregiving skills, rather than removing
children from the home.284 Although the risks of keeping children with abusive
custodians are great, removal from nonabusive custodians also has potentially
grave consequences, 285 particularly since children are often consequently removed from their network of siblings, relatives, friends, and peers. It is only
when there is no real prospect of maintaining children’s custodial attachments,
or when their safety is clearly at risk, that removal from primary caregivers is
warranted.286 If the state must remove children, it should take steps to maintain
children’s ties to siblings, other relatives, stepparents, friends, and teachers.287
For the same reason, the state has a duty to take children’s caregiving interests into account in other contexts as well. Criminal sentencing, for example,
may seriously strain children’s relationships with incarcerated caregivers,288 as

284.

285.

286.

287.

288.

reasonable efforts to reunite families); Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers for Children Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth Century on Best Interests and the Role
of the Child Advocate, 41 FAM. L. Q. 393, 397-98 (2007); Lois A Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary Caregivers, and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1512 (2012).
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 268, at 224 (“[T]he state needs to adopt a fundamentally different approach to family law that carefully targets intervention at the most critical junctures
where families need support.”); ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 267-68 (“The very structure of
child welfare is fundamentally ﬂawed . . . . Instead of supporting families, it punishes them
by taking children from their homes for placement in foster care. Redressing this racial harm
requires placing greater control over child welfare services in Black communities, addressing
the deprivation of poor and minority families, and eliminating the coercive function of a system that is supposed to serve them.”).
See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973);
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 n.17 (“Any parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parents’ rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unﬁt.”
(emphasis omitted)). As emphasized in the previous Section, children should be removed
from the home only when parents or custodians are directly harming children, rather than
when they are failing to protect them from third-party harm. See supra text accompanying
notes 244-246.
For example, foster care that emphasizes kinship placement may reﬂect, reinforce, and further
children’s basic attachment ties with their family of origin. See Megan M. O’Laughlin, Note,
A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key To Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reuniﬁcation, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1451-52 (1998).
Incarceration separates the parent and child during the time of incarceration and, in many
states, may be cause to terminate parental rights. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”:
Mothering, Feminism, and Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161 (2012).
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may the deportation of parents under the federal immigration laws.289 And treaties like the Hague Convention, which governs international custody disputes,
may be applied in ways that disrupt custodial ties.290
Finally, our framework also affirms that many adults in the community other
than caregivers or state actors have, or should have, legal obligations to protect
children from harm. Existing law imposes affirmative duties to report child
abuse and neglect on teachers, doctors, nurses, therapists, and other professionals.291 Lawyers for minor children have special duties, as do guardians ad litem.292
Psychiatrists must make an independent assessment before parents can commit
a child to a public psychiatric hospital.293 Employers have duties not to employ
minors under certain circumstances.294 Shopkeepers have duties not to sell alcohol, cigarettes, or pornography to minors, and any adult can be criminally liable
for providing a child with alcohol or drugs.295 Sellers must adhere to special rules
when advertising to children296 and collecting personal information online about
children,297 and banks and other ﬁnancial actors must know when they are dealing with minors.298 All adults also have the duty not to engage in sexual relations

289.

David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV.
L.J. 1165 (2006).
290. See, e.g., Janet Chiancone, Linda Girdner & Patricia Hoff, Issues in Resolving Cases of International Child Abduction by Parents, Juvenile Justice Bulletin (Dec. 2001).
291. See Children’s Bureau, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. 1-2 (2016), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2C8Y-X5W9] (summarizing state laws on professionals required to report).
292. See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 2001); Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between
Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63 (2008).
293. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-08 (1979).
294. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2012) (prohibiting oppressive child labor). In some employment
contexts, such as the entertainment industry, a child may work only under strict regulations,
and employers are responsible for following these laws. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-12-104
(West 2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8.1 (West 2018).
295. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (2012) (providing that knowing transfers of obscene material to a
minor below the age of sixteen may result in imprisonment for up to ten years).
296. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding a city
ordinance that regulated alcohol advertisements in areas minor children were likely to frequent). The federal Children’s Television Act of 1990 also imposes requirements for advertising appearing during programming targeting children. Children’s Television Act of 1990
§ 102, 47 U.S.C. § 303a (2012).
297. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2012).
298. See, e.g., FDIC Rules, § 1020.100(c)(1)(2)(A).
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with a minor; because statutory rape is a strict liability crime, it imposes a responsibility on adults to verify their partner’s age. Our new framework incorporates these responsibilities of noncaregiving adults into a cohesive structure consistent with the custodial and state responsibilities discussed above and lays the
groundwork for articulating and expanding these adult duties to children.
2. Education
The tripartite framework imposes responsibilities on both caregivers and the
state to ensure that children are afforded a meaningful educational experience,
one that fosters children’s present well-being as well as their development over
time.299 As traditionally understood, school provides children with a place for
intellectual study, social engagement, and democratic socialization.300 Schools
teach children to express their ideas and beliefs and to think critically. Courts
have readily recognized these traditional educational goals as legitimate and desirable.301 Less considered are the ways in which schools provide children with
opportunities to develop relationships with adults and children outside their
families, as well as expose children to ideas outside the home. Schools also provide spaces for play, mentorship, and peer friendships.
Our framework views children’s education as a sphere of shared responsibilities rather than a contest between parents and the state for control over children’s upbringing. Parents and other custodial caregivers generally provide foundational learning experiences for children prior to formal education, but the state
can better support parents in this task. Our framework’s reinforcement of adult
responsibilities to children opens up space to advocate for state funding of early
educational interventions in the form of high-quality daycare and preschool.302

299.

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954))).
300. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Brown, 347 U.S.
483; see also Dailey, supra note 78, at 458 (explaining that social and legal commentators “identify schools as the place where the reasoning skills of democratic citizenship are cultivated”).
301. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which
should be diligently promoted.”).
302. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (2006). Studies
have also shown that early investment may yield substantial long-term savings for the state.
See James Heckman et al., Understanding the Mechanisms Through Which an Inﬂuential Early
Childhood Program Boosted Adult Outcomes, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2052 (2013); Katherine A.
Magnuson et al., Inequality in Preschool Education and School Readiness, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J.
115, 144 (2004).
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Most states start their public educational programs with part-day kindergarten
classes for children when they reach the age of ﬁve, but this entry into formal
schooling comes too late for many children. 303 Although the most privileged
children do not suffer from delayed school, presumably because their parents
have the resources to provide them with private daycare, other children suffer
because most parents struggle to ﬁnd affordable preschool programs.304 Schooling that begins at age ﬁve thus sets in place an invisible barrier to equality in
education that contributes to a life-long achievement gap between the rich and
poor.305 By more fully funding high-quality daycare and preschool, states may
better support caregivers while also accepting more direct responsibility for
providing meaningful education experiences for all children.
Our approach also imposes responsibilities on caregivers and the state to ensure that children are exposed to new ideas and ways of life when they are at
school. The Supreme Court has not overlooked the value of exposing children
to a diversity of viewpoints in school. In Tinker, for example, the Court observed
that free speech is not enjoyed in isolation, but through communication with
other students “in the cafeteria, or on the playing ﬁeld, or on the campus during
the authorized hours.”306 Our framework builds on the Supreme Court’s recognition that children beneﬁt from a broad range of experiences in school tied to
their intellectual learning, their relationships with others, and their exposure to
new ideas.
There are multiple ways of exposing children to diverse viewpoints at school,
but children must ﬁrst be at school to beneﬁt from that exposure. In contrast to
the authorities framework, which gives wide latitude to parents seeking to
homeschool their children, our new framework—with its attention to children’s
broader interests—would support the general prohibition of homeschooling for
children beyond the primary grades. 307 Some allowance should of course be
made for children with special needs, for example, elite athletes or children with
303.

See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION (Jack P. Shonkoff & Samuel J.
Meisels eds., 2d ed. 2000).
304. Currently, states that fund such programs cannot guarantee children spots if they are eligible,
with most states serving less than half of the intended population. See Magnuson et al., supra
note 302, at 119.
305. The federal Head Start Program is designed in part to address this educational disparity, but
the program has suffered from inadequate funding and resources and there seems to be a lack
of consistent research gauging the program’s effectiveness. See id. at 123-24. For more discussion of these issues, see Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Law, 90 S.
CAL. L. REV. 755 (2017).
306. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
307. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights
over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (2016) (arguing that homeschooling should be
prohibited).
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severe developmental disabilities. But homeschooling should not be allowed as
a matter of right for families that wish to shield their children from outside inﬂuences. Custodians and the state under our framework have a shared responsibility to afford children some opportunity to engage in the broader world as they
grow, and schools outside of the home are vital to that effort. Even though homeschooling may be appropriate for younger children, increased regulation of the
curriculum of such homeschools will ensure that these children beneﬁt from experiences outside the home.
3. Rehabilitation
Custodial caregivers and the state should also share responsibility for addressing children’s misconduct, both inside and outside the home. Our framework posits rehabilitation as the primary justiﬁcation for the punishment of children. Given children’s capacity for change and their predisposition to cognitive,
emotional, and moral learning, rehabilitation should guide adult response to
children’s misconduct.308 While deterrence and retributive goals have a role to
play in children’s punishment, they should be secondary to rehabilitative aims.
As we have already stressed, children are developing individuals with a unique
capacity for change—ﬂexibility, plasticity, regenerativity of mind—that distinguishes them from the adults they will someday become.309 What might be settled character in an adult is likely a transient behavioral stage for a child.310
Our framework thus imposes on custodial caregivers a duty to direct their
discipline of children toward rehabilitative aims consistent with children’s
broader interests. Punishment in the home must respect children’s interests in
bodily integrity and personal safety. Although over thirty countries ban corporal
punishment of children, prevailing law in the United States permits “reasonable”
corporal punishment in the service of parental discipline.311 Parental and other
308.

Cf. Anca Gheaus, The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society, in THE NATURE OF CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 35, 41 (Alexander Bagattini & Colin Macleod
eds., 2015) (“So children, like adults, are rational beings; the difference between them is that
children are better at imagining things while adults—who have the beneﬁt of experience and
enhanced self-control—are better at turning imagination into reality.”).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
311. See Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 147 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also State v. Lefevre, 117 P.3d 980 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
The parental discipline defense is available in abuse cases even where the defendant is not the
legal parent of the child. See State v. Roman, 199 P.3d 57 (Haw. 2008). Corporal punishment
is also allowed in school. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the practice
of corporal punishment in public schools against Eighth Amendment challenges).
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adult authority appear to be the primary justiﬁcation for this practice, for it is
clear that corporal punishment has few beneﬁcial developmental effects.312 Instead, research strongly suggests that corporal punishment generally does not
further children’s interests and may in fact thwart them.313 Corporal punishment
thus should be prohibited in most, if not all, circumstances. Instead, caregivers
under our framework have a responsibility to discipline their children in ways
that foster children’s capacity for learning and growth, as well as respect their
bodily integrity and personal safety. States may support caregivers in these efforts by offering information about disciplinary techniques more consistent with
children’s broader interests.
Rehabilitative aims should also inform state actors’ responses to children’s
misconduct outside of the home. Our framework provides justiﬁcations for reorienting the juvenile justice system to harness children’s heightened capacity for
change through rehabilitation314 while at the same time ensuring children are
protected by basic procedural rights. Accordingly, our framework imposes responsibilities on judges, prosecutors, and legislators to address children’s delinquent activities in a juvenile justice system oriented toward rehabilitation and
the provision of services. These responsibilities would also generally prohibit the
transfer of most children to the adult criminal justice system, which is often primarily retributive in nature. Indeed, transfer to adult court fails to take account
of empirical evidence showing children’s unique capacity for brain development
and change,315 and the harsh sentencing that often results ignores the psychological vulnerability of adolescents to stressful environmental factors, such as
peer violence, poverty, and parental abuse or neglect.316 The jurisdiction of the

312.

313.
314.

315.
316.

See Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm Than Good: A Summary of Scientiﬁc Research on the Intended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
31 (2010).
See id. at 43-47; Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal Punishment of Children, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 238-240 (2007).
The system was originally designed to serve rehabilitative goals, but the system has become
increasingly punitive in nature. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida To Challenge
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 107 (2010) (noting that “many of the juvenile transfer
laws were signiﬁcantly expanded during the 1990s as part of a ‘moral panic’ that seemed to
take over the country”); Alison Powers, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory Sentencing
of Juveniles Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L.
REV. 241, 249 (2009).
See supra text accompanying notes 309-310.
Kimberly S. May, Shifting Away from Rehabilitation: State v. Ladd’s Equal Protection Challenge
to Alaska’s Automatic Waiver Law, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 367, 384-85 (1998) (“The real harshness
in treating youthful offenders as adults lies in the impact of adult sentences on a minor’s development. . . . Juveniles incarcerated in prison are especially vulnerable to inmate violence
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juvenile court might be extended past the age of majority in cases where older
children commit serious crimes, but, under our approach, the primary goal of
rehabilitation should still govern.
Likewise, when a child is accused of a “status offense”—engaging in behavior
that is unlawful only for children, such as disobeying parents, running away,
truancy, violating a curfew, or drinking alcohol—the state should not automatically punish or criminalize the offense.317 Instead, the state should work with
parents or others in the community to help bring their child’s behavior under
control through, for example, substance abuse programs, counseling, and afterschool activities.
4. Civic Engagement
Our framework also recognizes adult responsibilities to further children’s engagement as members of society. The Supreme Court has long validated the idea
that adults have the responsibility to foster children’s growth as future citizens. 318 In one of its earliest decisions on education, for example, the Court
wrote: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.”319 And in one of its most signiﬁcant
First Amendment cases, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
Court held that students could not be compelled to pledge allegiance to the
ﬂag.320 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson appealed to the state’s role
in educating children for civic participation: “That they are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”321 Nine
years later, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education hinged on the importance
of an equal education to children’s future well-being as workers and citizens.322

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

and sexual assault, and have a high risk of contracting AIDS. The isolation associated with
incarceration may breed mental illness or reinforce existing feelings of anger and alienation,
and adult prisons lack treatment facilities that juvenile centers may be able to provide. Imprisoned juveniles also have a high risk of suicide.”).
Cf., Cynthia Godsoe, Contempt, Status, and the Criminalization of Non-Conforming Girls, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 1091 (2014).
See Dailey, supra note 13.
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 637.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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And perhaps the Supreme Court’s most sustained analysis of adults’ duty to raise
future members of society came in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court elaborated
on the qualities children need to participate as full adults in the life of the nation.323
Although the prevailing focus on developing children’s capacities as future
civic participants is important, it does not go far enough. Our framework emphasizes children’s status as full members of society as well as adults’ responsibilities to support that status. The responsibility to foster children’s present engagement as members of the broader society encompasses not only participation
in school but also engagement in the world through part-time paid work, volunteer activities, community sports, or political activism.
Parents carry the primary responsibility for furthering children’s interests in
engaging in the world through such civic opportunities. Moreover, because children do not now have the right to vote, their parents have the obligation to represent children’s interests in the political process. But parents are not the only
adults with responsibilities to further children’s civic participation interests. The
state also has a responsibility to recognize and facilitate these interests. In particular, the state has a responsibility to help children overcome concrete barriers
to participation through the provision of transportation, afterschool activities,
and opportunities to work and engage in the political process.
This conception of the state’s role in facilitating children’s broader engagement also offers a new way of thinking about the state’s responsibility to provide
children with access to reproductive healthcare, including contraception and
abortion. Older children’s ability to attend school, to work, and to participate in
political activities often turns on meaningful access to such care. Although the
Supreme Court has held that states do not have a constitutional duty to provide
abortion services to adults,324 our framework suggests that children’s status as
children should yield a different constitutional standard. As explained below,325
because children are always in the custody of someone—whether parents or the
state—these custodians have affirmative obligations to children that go well beyond the state duties owed to adults. These obligations include an affirmative
duty on the part of the state to ensure that children have access to reproductive
healthcare free from parental vetoes, as well as duties to disseminate information
about such services and cover their costs.

323.

406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). Plyler v. Doe, which extended education rights to undocumented
immigrant children, also rested in part on the importance of education to these children’s potential for becoming future citizens. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
324. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
325. See infra Section III.C.1.
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In some ways, all adult responsibilities for children may be categorized as
duties to ensure children’s full civic membership. What we mean to emphasize
here are the speciﬁc duties arising out of children’s broader interests in education
and in social and political engagement. As we will discuss in Section III.C, the
tripartite framework guarantees that some adult responsibilities give rise to corresponding affirmative rights for children.
***
While we have focused here on state and parental responsibilities, our new
law of the child also opens the door to articulating and developing children’s responsibilities as children. The authorities framework risks treating children’s responsibilities as an on/off switch: either children are dependent and not responsible for their behavior, or they are autonomous, responsible individuals. In
contrast, the new law of the child brings out the ways in which children are responsible as children. Children have responsibilities to obey their parents, to attend school, to refrain from tortious and criminal conduct, and to treat other
children with respect. While there are synergies between our approach and the
current regime of status offenses, the latter remains ﬁrmly wedded to enforcing
parental control over children. In contrast, we aim to develop rules and institutions to govern children’s status as dependent, yet responsible, individuals.
In opening up avenues for children to engage in the broader society through
school, work, and community and political activities, the new law of the child
highlights children’s responsibilities to take advantage of these opportunities.
Children’s own responsibilities would be fostered, for example, through school
policies requiring participation in activities, juvenile justice dispositions mandating community service, and education programs for substance abuse, driving,
and voting.
C. Rights
Our tripartite framework opens up new ways of thinking about children’s
rights rooted in children’s broader interests as children. Under our framework,
rights do not operate solely to protect older children against coercive state action
or overbearing parents. While our approach posits that children’s rights encompass some adult autonomy rights—such as the right to freedom of speech, to free
exercise of religion, or to privacy, as well as some important criminal procedure
rights—our approach tailors almost all of these agency rights to ﬁt children’s
unique status as children. We also underscore the role of affirmative constitutional rights in recognizing and protecting children’s interests in certain relationships, services, opportunities, and experiences in the here and now. Children’s
rights therefore reﬂect the many ways in which children are not merely lesser
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adults, but rather are full members of society deserving of rights derived from
their special status as children.
Our approach to children’s rights therefore brings new conceptual clarity to
the constitutional rights children currently enjoy and lays out new rights that
children should enjoy. Under our framework, children’s rights have certain distinguishing features: they are rooted in children’s broader interests; they are dynamic, adapting across time to children’s evolving capacities and circumstances;
they include affirmative entitlements to relationships, goods, and services; and
they terminate upon reaching the relevant age of majority. Unlike children’s interests, which generally come in as factors to be weighed in designing and applying legal rules, children’s rights are forceful claims either for or against state
action.
We divide children’s rights into three categories: affirmative rights to certain
resources; agency rights specially crafted to meet children’s autonomy interests
as they evolve over time; and rights to equality and procedural justice. Some of
these rights exist under current constitutional doctrine, but many do not. We
begin with the category of affirmative constitutional rights because this concept
of rights is inextricably tied to adult responsibilities for children and most clearly
implements children’s broader interests in the here and now. Children’s affirmative claims on the state also depart most dramatically from the authorities framework’s exclusive reliance on negative rights.
1. Affirmative Rights
Under the tripartite framework, some limited, but not insigniﬁcant, number
of adult duties will give rise to affirmative rights enforceable in court. In this
regard, our approach challenges existing assumptions about the Constitution as
a charter of negative liberties. The Supreme Court has stated outright that children have no affirmative rights, including no right to physical safety in the
home,326 but that analysis ignores children’s special custodial status.327 We reject
the classic liberal view that the federal Constitution is exclusively a charter of

326.
327.

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989).
As the Supreme Court stated in Schall v. Martin, “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
form of custody.” 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
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negative liberties.328 A constitutional regime of negative liberties for adults does
not necessarily preclude recognition of affirmative rights for children.329
The Court’s clearest pronouncement of the classic liberal view came in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 330 In this case,
Joshua DeShaney and his mother brought suit against the local department of
social services arguing that Joshua had been denied his constitutional right to
protection from abuse at the hands of his father.331 In rejecting the claim, the
Supreme Court observed that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no afﬁrmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual.”332 The Court recognized an exception to this general rule
where “the State takes a person into custody and holds him there against his
will,”333 but considered Joshua to be in the private custody of his father.334
Under our framework, DeShaney was wrongly decided. By focusing on earlier cases rejecting adults’ affirmative rights to housing, food, and medical
care,335 the Supreme Court failed to consider the existence of children’s affirmative rights grounded in their special status as children. Children are always in the
custody of others, whether their parents or the state; they are also legally disabled from taking steps to protect themselves. Based on these conditions, children
have special claims to state protection in the home. In some cases, the Court has
already come close to recognizing these entitlements, gesturing in the direction

328.

329.
330.
331.

332.
333.
334.

335.

See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2278-97
(1990); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1907
(2001).
See Dailey, supra note 13, at 2169.
489 U.S. 189.
Id. at 193. The facts, as Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded, were “undeniably tragic.” Id. at 191.
Joshua DeShaney’s father beat the four-year-old boy so severely that he suffered permanent
brain damage. Id. at 193; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court and a Life Barely Lived,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/opinion/the-supreme
-court-and-a-life-barely-lived.html [http://perma.cc/9YEF-S98J] (describing the case’s legacy).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 201. The two dissenting opinions critiqued the decision on the ground that the state was
deeply implicated in the violence against Joshua, having removed the boy from the father’s
care originally and then having returned him despite being aware of the risks of doing so. Id.
at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
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of granting children minimal entitlements to education336 and custody,337 although never explicitly recognizing these as rights. Our framework would take
the next step, unambiguously articulating that adult responsibilities for children’s education and custody create corresponding rights to those services.
Not all adult responsibilities will give rise to affirmative rights enforceable
by children. But many will. Under our framework, children at a minimum have
affirmative rights to custodial care, education, safety inside and outside the
home, and rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. But children’s affirmative
rights might also be enforced in custody, delinquency, immigration, and other
proceedings. In these contexts, where the state is already involved, children’s afﬁrmative rights might extend to rights to relationships with siblings and peers;
rights to be exposed to ideas and people outside the home; and rights of access
to play, creative arts, sports, and other activities. Importantly, the existence of
such broad affirmative rights does not mean that children will in all instances
have the right to initiate judicial proceedings against the state. Rather, children’s
affirmative rights may be satisﬁed by agency and other action.
Children’s affirmative constitutional rights grant children access to certain
goods and services not provided to adults. For example, under the authorities
336.

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (observing that public education “[is not] some
governmental ‘beneﬁt’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”). The
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) is an important step in the direction of
recognizing an entitlement to education. In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, for
example, the Supreme Court held under IDEA schools must offer an individualized educational program that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate
in light of the child’s circumstances,” which means more than “de minimis” progress. No. 15827, slip op. at 11, 14 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15
-827_0pm1.pdf [http://perma.cc/PDE8-EY4Q]. Along the same lines, our proposed tripartite framework imposes a responsibility on states to aim to provide an equal educational environment for all children. We acknowledge, however, that courts and lawmakers have difficulty complying with constitutional demands. In Connecticut, a desegregation lawsuit ﬁled
in 1989 is still being litigated as the parties seek to implement the state Supreme Court’s ruling. See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas & Jake Kara,
Judge: Magnet Schools Cannot Be Made More Segregated, THE CONN. MIRROR (June 16, 2017),
http://ctmirror.org/2017/06/16/judge-magnet-schools-cannot-be-made-more-segregated
[http://perma.cc/YNB6-PSQ9]; Vanessa de la Torre, Left Behind: 20 Years After Sheff v.
O’Neill, Students Struggle in Hartford’s Segregated Neighborhood Schools, HARTFORD COURANT
(Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.courant.com/education/hc-sheff-left-behind-day-1-20170319
-story.html [http://perma.cc/3VC6-76DJ].
337. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (“The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the
child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child,
unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody.’”) (emphasis added); Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by deﬁnition, are not assumed to have the capacity to
take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
parental control falters, the State must play its part . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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approach, poverty is a primary risk factor for a ﬁnding of neglect and the removal
of children from the home, particularly for families of color.338 In contrast, our
new framework sees family poverty as a trigger for the state’s obligation to provide material support so that children’s interests in remaining with parents
might be met. Younger children also might have affirmative rights to preschool
as part of their educational rights,339 and older children might have affirmative
rights to certain health-care services such as contraceptives and abortion, drug
and alcohol counseling, and residential care for mental health issues. By reorienting our focus towards family poverty, cases like Harris v. McRae, the Supreme
Court decision holding that the federal Constitution does not guarantee women
access to funding for an abortion,340 would come out differently for children.
Our framework thus draws upon current federal and state statutory law to
develop a model of children’s affirmative rights under the Constitution. Federal
and state statutes currently provide families with a range of entitlements to food,
housing, healthcare, and other basic goods. For example, the child welfare system entails multiple services from the state, including the federal requirement
that states provide “reasonable efforts” to reunify removed children with their
parents before terminating parental rights.341 Although these are all statutory
entitlements, they provide a blueprint for what a full-bodied scheme of affirmative constitutional rights might look like. Similarly, the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child offers helpful guidance to the development of a scheme of
affirmative constitutional rights speciﬁcally geared toward children in the United
States.342
Under our framework, affirmative rights enrich children’s experiences as
children: they aim to constitute civic participants, not control them; they reha-
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See Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 763, 764-65 (2001);
Beth A. Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System: Racism, Patriarchy, and the Presumptive Removal of Children from Victims of Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1131, 1150-1156 (2005).
See Ryan, supra note 302.
448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
See supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
G.A. Res. 44/25, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx [http://perma.cc/65MD
-M4Y6].
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bilitate and protect rather than punish; and they operationalize adult responsibilities for children. In this sense, we envision a more transformative, affirmative
role for children’s rights in American law.343
2. Agency Rights
Our framework also takes a fresh look at autonomy rights for children. Rather than simply extending some adult autonomy rights to children,344 as the
authorities framework does, we develop the concept of “agency rights” as a way
of emphasizing that children are active participants in shaping their own lives
while simultaneously dependent on adults. Agency rights thus differ from classic
autonomy interests because they encompass children’s interests as children in directing their lives. Our concept of agency rights conceptualizes children not in
relation to adults but instead as persons with the capacity to play active roles in
shaping their present lives. 345 Children’s agency rights therefore serve much
more than children’s interests in exercising adult-like autonomy.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker illustrates the descriptive and normative value of viewing children’s agency rights as rooted in children’s broader
interests, rather than in their capacity to make autonomous decisions.346 Tinker
in part recognized children’s autonomy interests in political expression, but the
Court also justiﬁed its holding on the ground that the classroom trains future
leaders.347 The Court expanded on this theme thirteen years later in Board of Education v. Pico, with the plurality emphasizing that children’s First Amendment
rights “prepare[] students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic,
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For similar efforts relating to adult affirmative rights, see Robin West, Unenumerated Duties,
9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221 (2006). See also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term—
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
As described in Part I, children historically were denied adult autonomy rights. See supra Section I.A. Beginning in the 1960s, advocates for “children’s liberation” argued that children
should be given the full range of rights enjoyed by adults. See, e.g., HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980); RICHARD EVANS FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974). While these
liberationist arguments did not fully succeed, over the next few decades the Supreme Court
began to recognize a limited number of adult rights for children, primarily in the areas of free
speech, reproductive freedom, and juvenile justice. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 13, at 277;
Wald, supra note 13, at 268.
See generally Abrams, supra note 132 (examining features of “agency” in feminist accounts).
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 512 (elaborating that such training occurs “through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection’” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967))).
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often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members.”348 The new
framework would analyze the issues raised in Tinker and Pico differently, focusing instead on the multiple ways the right to free speech facilitates children’s
present interests in expressing their own views, furthering their access to new
ideas, and playing an active role in the world around them.
Our approach would therefore dictate a different outcome in cases like Morse
v. Frederick, in which the Supreme Court undervalued the importance of children’s speech interests by permitting a school to suspend a student for holding
up a banner at a school event with the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”349 Although state attempts to reduce drug use are clearly important, the Court in Morse
failed to recognize the other interests at play, including the way in which the
speech furthered the child’s relationships with peers and his expression of resistance to school authority.
Under our framework, courts would determine the scope of children’s
agency rights by weighing children’s broader interests in the context of a particular claim. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,350 the
Supreme Court held that California could not limit the sale or rental of violent
video games to children. In reaching that holding, the Court emphasized that
“minors are entitled to a signiﬁcant measure of First Amendment protection, and
only in relatively narrow and well-deﬁned circumstances may government bar
public dissemination of protected materials to them.”351 The Court emphasized
that although “a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm,”
that power “does not include a free-ﬂoating power to restrict the ideas to which
children may be exposed.”352
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown took some tentative steps in the direction of recognizing and weighing children’s broader interests. The Court
rightly respected children’s interests as consumers, as well as their interests in
exposure to ideas, but the Court’s analysis did not seriously consider the subjective effects of playing violent video games on children. 353 Instead, the Court
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Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867, 868 (1982).
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
Id. at 794 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975)).
Id. at 794-95.
For a critique of Brown that emphasizes the role of government in supporting parents’ efforts
to protect children from the harmful effects of video games, see Martin Guggenheim, Violent
Video Games and the Rights of Children: A Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 707 (2014).
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largely extended free speech rights to children on the same terms as adults.354 As
Justice Breyer noted in dissent, the decision was tone deaf to the adverse psychological effects these games might have on children’s present and future lives, as
this “play” might be frightening, overwhelming, or otherwise harmful to
younger children. 355 This oversight is not surprising given the authorities
framework’s focus on children as either fully dependent or fully autonomous beings. The Brown Court chose to view children as autonomous, respecting some
children’s present interests as consumers while ignoring other children’s present
interests in protection from harm.
Our framework rejects Brown’s all-or-nothing approach. Instead, a focus on
children’s broader interests calls for a consideration of multiple factors, including
children’s interests in acquiring and playing violent video games; the adverse
impact of violent video games on some children’s subjective experience in the
here and now; and children’s interests as consumers and intellectually curious
civic participants. The inquiry should focus on weighing adult responsibilities
to protect children from harm—which the Court rightly recognized in Brown—
against children’s interests in being engaged as consumers. In ruling for the children, the Brown Court may have arrived at the right result, but for the wrong
reasons. The Court’s analysis privileged a conception of children’s autonomy that
displaced a more rigorous weighing of children’s competing interests in playing
and avoiding violent video games.
The existence of children’s agency rights will sometimes mean children have
the entitlement to go to court to have the right enforced, as Brown suggests. But
agency rights might also arise in many ongoing proceedings, such as school suspension hearings, custody hearings, parental termination proceedings, immigration hearings, judicial bypass proceedings, and juvenile justice and criminal proceedings. Rights in these contexts might range from full-blown entitlements,
such as the right to be represented by an attorney, to less robust entitlements,
such as the right to be heard in custody proceedings.
Whatever the context, recognition of children’s agency rights will sometimes
raise direct conﬂicts between parents and children seeking control over decisions
affecting their own lives. Under our framework, for example, a transgender child
seeking transition-related healthcare against her parents’ wishes might have the
right to go to court to seek judicial approval for the treatment, and courts might
grant such permission based on the child’s broader interests in bodily integrity

354.

564 U.S. at 795 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that
a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” (quoting Erznozik, 422 U.S. at 213-214)).
355. See id. at 851-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and expression of identity. Irrevocable procedures might still be denied, but our
framework would open the door to allowing some children, with medical support, to begin transitioning before the age of sixteen. Such an outcome is at direct
odds with existing law, which generally requires parental consent before health
care professionals may administer medical treatment to a minor.356 The recognition of children’s agency rights therefore may break new ground, expanding children’s abilities to direct the arcs of their lives even as they remain dependent on
adults for care and support.
3. Equality and Other Rights
Finally, our framework also embraces rights to equality and procedural justice, reconceiving important Supreme Court decisions. Brown v. Board of Education, for example, is the seminal case in the history of children’s equality rights.357
As discussed earlier, the case supports our view that the Constitution confers on
children the affirmative right to a meaningful education, but Brown is better
known for its principle of equality. At the same time, although Brown was a pathbreaking holding for race relations, transforming the everyday lives of many children, it did not transform children’s equality rights more broadly. Even after
Brown, children by deﬁnition are not considered similarly situated to adults and
therefore have few claims to equal treatment. Children may be denied the wide
range of rights enjoyed by adults, including the fundamental rights to vote, to
marry, to work, and to travel freely.358
While our framework agrees that the state has a basis for treating children
differently than adults given children’s unique status as children, we argue that
this fact actually heightens equality concerns. The state should be particularly
sensitive to equality when children are involved because so much is at stake for
children in terms of both their present well-being and their future lives. The Supreme Court gestured in this direction in Plyler v. Doe, which recognized the
right of undocumented immigrant children to attend public school.359 Together,

356.

See Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment
in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770 (2002). The statutory age of majority for health care decisions varies by state. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-340 (2008)
(providing that individuals age sixteen and older may consent).
357. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
358. See supra Part I.
359. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
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Plyler and Brown should be read to stand for the proposition that children’s special status as children, particularly when it comes to education, brings with it
heightened protection against state discrimination.
The new law of the child also builds upon existing laws emphasizing the
importance of expansive procedural rights for children as a means of protecting
their privacy and reputations and facilitating their rehabilitation. In J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, for example, the Supreme Court held that age must be taken into
account for purposes of establishing whether a child is “in custody” and therefore must be given Miranda warnings.360 School suspensions also call for heightened procedural protections.361 And in Parham v. J.R., the Court recognized the
need to establish greater procedural safeguards for the review of children’s admission to psychiatric hospitals given children’s special interests in personal integrity, privacy, and reputation.362
Other rights for children remain to be explored, including political rights.
Some political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, may be addressed as agency rights. The right to vote is among the agency rights most universally denied under the authorities framework.363 Children simply are not considered eligible for the franchise until they reach the age of eighteen. Under our
framework, this legal presumption is up for reconsideration.364 There might be
some contexts, particularly at the local level, where older children should be
given full or fractional rights to vote. Expanding the category of children’s rights
to include political rights would imply a correlative responsibility on the part of
children to participate in civic life.
conclusion
This Article has set forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and
shaping the ﬁeld of children and law, one that is oriented around children’s interests in the here and now rather than adult control. We aim to purge the law
of traditional assumptions about children’s status as lesser adults in need of adult
authority above all else. Our new paradigm therefore sets aside longstanding debates over dependency and autonomy in order to further children’s broader interests as children. We do so by offering a new conceptual framework for policymakers, advocates, and judges that focuses on children’s broad interests in the
here and now.
360.
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This new framework seeks to facilitate children’s relationships through law,
including children’s relationships with their parents as well as their nonhierarchical relationships with siblings, peers, and adults who are not their parents.
The framework also articulates a broader set of actors, including family members
and state officials, who carry legally recognized and shared responsibilities toward children, including responsibilities for caregiving and protection, education, rehabilitation, and fostering civic engagement. Finally, our framework offers a robust theory of children’s affirmative rights to certain relationships,
goods, and services, as well as a new conceptual understanding of children’s
agency and equality rights.
The new law of the child rooted in this framework aims to transform law’s
treatment of children and their interactions with others, thus encouraging new
ways of living for children and adults. Our analysis does more than describe the
world as it is; it also uncovers aspects of children’s lives currently obscured by
law and, in turn, reimagines how law might best govern, protect, and enrich the
lives of children both in the present and over time. Of course, this normative
account will be contested, and we welcome dialogue and debate about how law
might best be reimagined to promote children’s broader interests. For now, this
Article offers our best attempt to establish the basic framework for a legal regime
that values children as full persons with broad interests and rights of their own.
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